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Former Ministers Issue Document Criticizing Foreign Policy

33480077a La Paz PRESENCIA in Spanish
24 Jan 88 pp 1, 9, 10

[Text] Former Foreign Ministers Raul Botelho Gozalvez, Gustavo Fernandez Saavedra, Jorge Escobari Cusicanqui and Gonzalo Romero Alvarez are the authors of the document "Critical Analysis of Bolivian Foreign Policy," in which they lay the groundwork for a "reorientation" of diplomatic action. The document reads:

1. Part One. General Policy

1.1. The foreign policy of the current administration altered the main lines of the country's international action. In point of fact:

a) It renounced in practice actions aimed at increasing the degree of autonomy of the country's international action and accepted Bolivia's dependent and marginal status in the international system as an immutable fact.

b) It discouraged Bolivia's active participation in Latin American cooperation and integration.

c) It weakened the country's actual participation in the Movement of Nonaligned Countries.

d) It detracted from the consistency and strength of the maritime reintegration policy.

1.2. The country's foreign policy has reflected its domestic policy. It is a consistently conservative, not to say reactionary, policy, both at home and abroad.

Nationally, the policy has had consequences such as the weakening of the domestic production machine; an increase in unemployment to intolerable levels; a widening of the gap between those who have too much and those who have nothing; and the obvious postponement of all forms of social policy, in education and health care in particular.

In foreign policy, this concept of outwardly oriented development has been characterized by:

a) Subordination of national interests and, at times, of national sovereignty itself to the interests and priorities of the policy of the developed countries, in particular the United States.

b) The unconditional and careless opening up of the domestic economy to so-called market forces, for the presumed purpose of helping domestic exporters. The consequence, however, has been to make the country more vulnerable externally, to erode domestic production capacity, to increase smuggling, to boost the levels of short-term debt and to perpetuate drug trafficking.

c) A striking coldness in bilateral and multilateral economic and political relations with the democratic and progressive countries of Latin America, in contrast with the frustrated attempt to establish close ties with the dictatorial regimes of Stroessner and Pinochet (in the latter case, until Chile broke off negotiations on the maritime issue).

1.3. This foreign policy rests on premises that may have been realistic in the 1950's, in the days of the first government of the national revolution, but that have been transcended by events in the late 1980's.

a) Even though the United States remains a world power whose interests cannot be ignored, it is no longer the hegemonic power of the postwar period. New centers of economic, technological and financial power have arisen in Europe, Japan and Southeast Asia, and they have altered the international balance in these areas and promoted the formation of a multipolar system that offers the developing countries various options for economic ties.

Concurrently, the productive base and the degree of economic autonomy of the Latin American countries have broadened and diversified, thus making possible political actions that underscore the presence of a new Latin American identity that differs from that of the great powers, as was shown during the Malvinas conflict; the initiatives of the Contadora Group and the Arias Plan in Central America; the problem of the foreign debt and the efforts towards economic cooperation and political understanding by the Group of the 8.

b) The importance of Bolivia's commercial and financial ties with the United States has declined significantly, as shown by the fact that from 1970 to 1985 national exports to that market dropped from 34 to 17 percent of the total and imports from 34 to 22 percent.

Moreover, as a result of the transformations in the world economic system, the United States is not particularly interested in the country's natural resources and small market. In those areas American attention is directed toward the large markets in developing countries like Brazil, India, Egypt, Indonesia and, possibly, Argentina and Mexico. Bolivia is not strategically important to the United States, whose regional priorities are clearly to be found in Central America and the Caribbean.

As we can see, it is neither reasonable nor realistic to make the country's economic development plans dependent solely on the United States.

c) In turn, it is neither reasonable nor realistic to make the country's economic development plans dependent on cooperation solely with the United States.

d) In contrast, Bolivia's economic, financial and political ties with the countries of Latin America have grown strikingly, in keeping with deep-seated trends towards

the restructuring of the international economic system, which are the consequence of the irreversible decline in the importance of raw materials in world production and trade and the geometrically increased significance of know-how and technology in production and trade.

This restructuring is reflected, on the one hand, in the formation of a dynamic central core of the world economy, which comprises the industrialized countries and is being joined by the socialist countries and the most advanced economies of the developing countries, such as Brazil, Southeast Asia, India and a few others, not including Bolivia. Moreover, it is fostering the formation of regional economic subsystems with their own division of labor, in which the smaller economies revolve around the more advanced countries in the region.

In the case of Bolivia, this trend is reflected in the aforementioned figures showing the decline in foreign trade with the United States and other industrialized countries, which should be contrasted with the increase in trade with Latin America. Indeed, in the 1970-1985 period Bolivia's exports to the developed countries (the United States, England, Germany, France and Japan) declined from 85 to 29 percent of the total and exports from 64.1 to 45 percent. During the same period, sales to the region (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru) rose from 8.3 to 60.1 percent of the total, and purchases from 15.5 to 41.5 percent. We should also remember that the national government's foreign debt to Argentina and Brazil, accounting for 65 percent of the total bilateral debt, is quite a bit higher than the amount owed to the United States and other industrialized countries in the same categories.

1.4. The results of this foreign policy are negative. In point of fact:

a) Economic policy shows disquieting signs of fragility, as manifested in heavy social pressures and in the constant complaints by the production sectors about the slowness of recovery. We are thus running the risk of again frustrating the stoic spirit of sacrifice with which the Bolivian people have borne the huge social cost of this policy.

Many of the major difficulties in the recovery phase of the economic model can be attributed to two external variables in which the government placed too many hopes. On the one hand, the flow of foreign financing, especially governmental, was very far from the amounts that are required for a real recovery of the Bolivian economy; in fact, there were no indications that a modest inflow of direct foreign investment could even begin. On the other, exports of minerals and other raw materials did not reach the levels that the government was hoping for, owing to the structural crisis in the prices of commodities.

b) Bolivia became isolated from Latin America and came to depend on the good will and interests of the developed countries, especially the United States. The country stopped sending a representative to the regional forum on the foreign debt (the Cartagena Consensus). It made no effort to go along with the integration project of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, nor did it join the Contadora Support Group. The final proof of the consequences of this policy of self-isolation has just come with the Group of 8's rejection of Bolivia's belated attempt to join.

In spite of the rhetorical veil with which the government is attempting to disguise the facts, it is obvious that the policy of an unconditional international open door is incompatible with the efforts of the other countries in the region to unite in a front of common action to tackle the problems of the foreign debt, protectionism in the industrialized countries, growing technological dependence and the net transfer of resources from the Latin American countries to the developed countries. In the political sphere proper, not the slightest attempt was made to go along with Latin American solidarity and attempts to find a Latin American solution to the conflicts in Central America and to consolidate the regional democratic process. On the contrary, in overt contrast with such a philosophy, the government agreed to the presence of American troops on national soil, prompting severe doubts throughout the continent about the real scope of this initiative.

1.5. Along with these underlying problems, which have to do with the very philosophy of foreign policy, we must also underscore a defect of form in the style of and motivation for its conduct. The country's foreign policy was clearly used to further personal political ambitions, to the detriment of the permanent and nonpartisan nature of national interests.

Part Two. The Policy of Maritime Reintegration

2.1. The policy of maritime reintegration, the cardinal objective of Bolivia's external activities, suffered the consequences of the faulty philosophy behind and the weak execution of our overall foreign policy, as examined in the preceding points. Bolivia's isolation from Latin America, mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs, severely restricted the leeway of national diplomacy.

Numerous commentators and authorities on the subject have already made their views known, and public opinion has formed a clearly negative judgment of this policy.

This document of general analysis inevitably reaches the conclusion that as this term of office draws to a close, both the channels of direct negotiation and those of multilateral action have been damaged.

2.2. Direct negotiation. Under its so-called "fresh approach" to the maritime problem, the administration chose the path of bilateral negotiations with Chile as the

only answer. To this end it unconditionally accepted the Chilean proposal of "rapprochement" as a preliminary step to negotiations on the underlying problem. Joint Commissions met, trade with Chile was stepped up, and any form of diplomatic action that might inconvenience the Pinochet regime was restrained, as happened at both the OAS and the United Nations on the issue of human rights.

2.3. Aside from this unwise approach, we must point out other, more serious errors with lasting consequences in the conduct of this hasty bilateral negotiation.

a) The assertion by the foreign minister in Cochabamba (HOY, 12 January 1986) that "the maritime problem does not require the mediation of friendly countries or of the church" and that "the OAS does not have jurisdiction in this matter," weakened Bolivia's position in the bilateral negotiations themselves by ruling out one of the most valuable tools of diplomatic pressure available to us and had an adverse impact on subsequent Bolivian actions in multilateral forums.

b) The manner in which the proposal that was submitted for Chile's consideration in Montevideo was prepared. Isolated, hasty consultations were held with a few individuals and institutions, consultations that were not as serious as the momentous nature of the Bolivian proposal demanded.

c) Lack of clarity concerning which of the two options presented to the Mapocho government (the corridor north of Arica or an enclave) was the real crux of the negotiations.

d) The inadequacy of the political and diplomatic dialogue with Peru, a country that Bolivia should have tried to bring into the negotiations from the outset, seeing to it that its own national interests were properly reflected in the prescription for a solution that was being sought. It is possible, however, that the reason for this inadequacy was that the real negotiations revolved around the enclave, in which case Peru's formal involvement would not be required. Needless to say, if this were the case, it would have serious long-range implications.

e) The nature of one of the alternatives presented to Chile, in which the prospects for Bolivia's sovereign contact with the Pacific Ocean were reduced. It called for a narrow corridor to a beach, not a port, in exchange for compensations that were not duly evaluated. In this proposal Bolivia offered Chile the waters of the high-plateau basin, which would be "chosen" by that country in a joint commission. Before formulating this proposal, the Foreign Ministry did not request the official judgment of any Bolivian institution or consult public opinion, as it ought to have.

f) An improper assessment of Chile's political and military situation, and the lack of suitable information on the position and interests of the internal power factors

that would have decisive importance in establishing the Chilean position and in rejecting the Bolivian proposal. Trust was unwisely placed in the good faith of La Moneda's foreign minister.

2.4. The errors in the conduct of Bolivian diplomacy do not, of course, either erase or disguise the fact that Chile is principally to blame for the failure of the direct negotiations. Its crass refusal to even consider the Bolivian proposal and its complete disdain for continental public opinion are an affront that the people of Bolivia will not forget.

The final result of this unfortunate bilateral effort is negative. In fact, the obstacles that will have to be surmounted in the future have increased, owing to the explicit and formal rejection by the neighboring government, the institutional pronouncement by one of its Armed Forces branches and the highly charged atmosphere that was created by the gross and offensive language that was used after the negotiations broke off.

2.5. Multilateral Action. After the failure of the bilateral effort, as described above, the National Government could have regained the initiative that it had voluntarily renounced and returned with greater authority to the path of multilateral efforts, once Chile had publicly demonstrated its lack of respect for continental public opinion and its scant willingness to find a solution to the problem of Bolivia's landlocked status.

2.6. Explanations for the outcome of the 1987 OAS Assembly must be sought in the particular "dynamism" of Bolivian diplomacy. We have already noted that the Bolivian Government itself had disavowed the jurisdiction of the OAS in the matter and placed all its hopes on the bilateral effort. Even now the foreign relations minister declares that "the support that is being given to Bolivia today...will continue to be given, even if it is just moral." He fails to observe that the true nature of the multilateral support for Bolivia's proposals is not moral but political and continentwide and that there are differences of form and substance between the pronouncements of the plenipotentiary representatives of the governments and the opinions of private individuals, which can indeed be only of moral value.

2.7. There are not just "some differences of form" between the resolutions of 1979 and 1987. The differences of substance have already been highlighted in editorials and in comments from authorized figures, but it would seem necessary to summarize the ones that have cast doubt on the scope of continental political support for Bolivia.

The preamble to the 1979 resolution states that "it is of permanent hemispheric interest to find an equitable solution whereby Bolivia obtains sovereign and useful access to the Pacific Ocean." These words confirm the

multilateral nature of the problem of Bolivia's landlocked status, which Chile maintained as a strictly bilateral matter until the passage of this resolution. The OAS Assembly, meeting in La Paz, acknowledged that the subsistence of the problem of Bolivia's landlocked status threatened peace and security on the continent because it kept alive a trouble spot in the zone, as reflected in a high level of military spending and ongoing preparations for war. The permanent nature of the continent's interest, moreover, means that the concern will continue until "an equitable solution whereby Bolivia obtains sovereign and useful access to the Pacific Ocean" is found. It has been observed that the expression "permanent hemispheric interest" is not to be found in the 1987 resolution.

Furthermore, the operative part of the 1987 resolution urges a resumption of negotiations to find a "prescription that will make it possible to give Bolivia an outlet to the Pacific Ocean." Naturally the expression that appears in the 1979 resolution and subsequent ones, "that Bolivia be given a free and sovereign territorial connection with the Pacific Ocean," is much more explicit and more clearly expresses the real, and only, possible purpose of such negotiations. Although its absence from the most recent resolution cannot alter the well-known scope of regional support, it is proof of an inexplicable flippancy on the part of the country's negotiators, and Chile could use it, by stretching the meaning of the words and concepts, to try and elude its responsibility at subsequent assemblies by indicating that it has already given Bolivia "an outlet to the Pacific Ocean" with the free-transit facilities provided for in the 1904 Treaty and other instruments.

The absence of the aforementioned expressions, which is the result of diplomatic errors, does not, of course, reflect the well-known political support of the Latin American countries for Bolivia's position, inasmuch as the continental solidarity that was enshrined in the text of the 1979 resolution undoubtedly persists. It specifically underscored "the permanent hemispheric interest in finding an equitable prescription so that Bolivia can obtain sovereign and useful access to the Pacific Ocean." It is now up to our national diplomacy to restore the wording whose elimination it allowed through an unpardonable oversight and because of a faulty understanding of its meaning and importance.

Part Three. Reorientation of Foreign Policy

3.1. To those who have signed this document there is no doubt that an in-depth reorientation of the country's foreign policy is necessary. Such a reorientation must be based on a widening nationwide debate and on a suitable process of consultations between the Executive Branch and the main institutions of the republic, such as Congress, the political parties, the Armed Forces, the universities, the mass media, former foreign ministers and specialists.

A national consensus, meaning popular approval of the objectives and goals of the country's external action, is the basis for the legitimacy of foreign policy, the conduct of which is constitutionally the responsibility of the president of the republic. The need to build this consensus is all the more imperative in the framework of a democratic process within which institutions that represent the will of the people are fully functioning.

It has been repeated many times that permanent national interests are above occasional domestic policy differences. They are not the property of individuals or parties. For that reason, special care must be taken in the formulation of the objectives and mechanisms of national diplomatic and political action so that they properly interpret those interests.

3.2. Such a foreign policy ought to center on the following main objectives:

- a) Preserving the territorial integrity, independence, sovereignty, security and culture of Bolivia.
- b) Broadening the degree of autonomy of Bolivia's international action in the political and economic spheres, and asserting an active presence in the international system, so as to overcome our currently dependent and marginal role.
- c) Putting an end to Bolivia's forced and circumstantial landlocked status and assuring sovereign and useful access to the Pacific Ocean.
- d) Actively playing Bolivia's role as the point of articulation and balance between the Amazon and River Plate basins and the Pacific coast.

3.3. To achieve these objectives, the country's foreign policy must rest on the following premises:

- a) The development of Bolivia is the responsibility of Bolivians, and none of the nation's problems will be resolved through the philanthropy and generosity of the developed countries, whether capitalist or socialist. We must recognize that development is not imported but is, rather, the result of an internal process of accumulation and change that makes proper use of the local endowment of human, technological and financial resources. Rather than lapse back into the already transcended illusion of isolation and inward-looking growth, which is not viable because of the limitations of our small market, the national economy must reach outward in a process of selective opening that will avoid breaking up the country's economic and social structures.

The alternative of development "from within," of modernizing the Bolivian economy, must seek to end the country's status as an exporter of only raw materials and

to guide it steadily towards more dynamic sectors, in manufacturing and services, by taking advantage of the options for change that the technological revolution offers.

Such a structural overhaul must resolve the paradox posed by the need to export raw materials at competitive prices in a perhaps more difficult market in order to reach the level of accumulation and diversification that is indispensable so that we can cease to be dependent on exports of raw materials.

This model, which differs fundamentally from the existing neoliberal model, which accepts specialization as an immutable fact, is based on the construction of a domestic market and on active cooperation with the countries of Latin America, which face these same difficulties and restrictions in their external relations.

b) Strengthening and according priority to economic and political ties with the countries of Latin America, particularly our neighbors, when possible through the regional and subregional mechanisms of economic integration, with the dual goal of facilitating domestic modernization and paving the way for a more equitable and beneficial participation on the international scene.

c) Adopting a clear-cut pattern of conduct and a well-defined *modus vivendi* in relations with the industrialized countries, especially with the United States, to establish mutually beneficial relations based on respect for the principles of self-determination and national sovereignty.

d) Effective participation in the Movement of Non-aligned Countries, to assert our independence from the major military blocs, to support the democratization of the international political system and to broaden the country's diplomatic leeway, with the goal of consolidating and projecting the solidarity of this group of nations with Bolivia's maritime reintegration.

3.4. The policy of maritime reintegration also requires a reorientation that takes the following elements into account:

a) Reaffirmation that this is a priority goal of the country's foreign policy, owing to considerations that go beyond the historical and judicial reasons that have traditionally supported the legitimacy of our nation's grievance and that are based, rather, on specific needs of the present and the immediate future.

The crisis in Andean mining and in the Pacific region contrasts with the prospects for development in the River Plate and Amazon regions of the country, which border on the largest nations in South America, Brazil and Argentina, to whose growth process the future of Bolivia will certainly be tied. The country must without question take advantage of these prospects by promoting this development trend. At the same time, however, it is obliged to safeguard domestic

regional balance and national unity. From this stems its obligation to pay preferential attention to the needs of the Andean and mining regions, whose prospects for development will improve substantially with a sovereign and direct access to the sea and the resulting projection of their economic influence into northern Chile and southern Peru.

If Bolivia regains sovereign access to the Pacific, its national unity will be strengthened and it will be able to play its role as a link between the great basins. If this objective is delayed, the dangers of an excessive and risky economic dependence and of becoming a political satellite of the two great neighbors on the Atlantic will mount.

As we can see, this is not a nostalgic grievance in connection with a lost and forgotten legacy. Bolivia is demanding not only what belongs to it but also what it needs to preserve its independence and to consolidate its geographic and political role on the continent.

b) An appropriate coordination of the complementary avenues of multilateral efforts and bilateral and trilateral negotiations. The first is designed to strengthen the bargaining capacity of Bolivia, whose claim cannot be on the directly interested States until a satisfactory solution is achieved. The Organization of American States, whose jurisdiction in the matter has been expressly acknowledged, plays a particularly significant role in this field. Bolivian diplomacy must, however, bear in mind the new space for multilateral action in Latin America, as a result of the democratic process and regional integration, such as the Group of the 8.

Nevertheless, international pressure will not be successful unless the States themselves, Chile and Peru, reach the conclusion that a peaceful and negotiated solution is also in their own national interest. This is the objective of bilateral diplomacy with Chile and with Peru, which must seek to remove the obstacles that certain circles in those nations are still placing in the way of resolving problems pending since the War of the Pacific. Such diplomatic activity must find support from the broad public opinion in Chile and Peru that denounces the unnecessary subsistence of a climate of tension and arms buildup that severely limits their economic and social development.

c) Explicit recognition that the objective of the policy of maritime reintegration is that Bolivia obtain an outlet to the sea with its own sovereign and useful coastline and port, with a direct and sovereign territorial connection with the country, and that the solution to the problem via negotiations that include Chile and Peru, must not provide for territorial compensations.

La Paz, January 1988 [signed] Gustavo Fernandez Saavedra, Raul Botello Gosalvez, Gonzalo Romero Alvarez-Garcia, Jorge Escobari Cusicanqui

Paper Calls for Effective Controls on Political Parties' Finances

33480077c *La Paz PRESENCIA in Spanish*
1 Feb 88 p 3

[Editorial: "The Political Parties and Their Financial Patrimony"]

[Text] Amid the poverty with which the country is struggling (a poverty that has always existed in comparison to other nations), one question has always been on the lips of society: Where do the political parties get so much money from, especially during election campaigns? All indications are that politics in our country is a profitable business, the source of big, juicy returns. During the campaign leading up to last December's elections a quite experienced politician said: "Politics in our country is the best way to raise funds, and being a candidate, the safe way."

As we recall, the election campaigns of 1978, 1979, 1980, 1985 and 1987 abounded in examples of waste and even excess not only in the area of publicity but also in personal proselytizing by the candidates themselves. And then there is this fact: we do not know what functions almost any high-level leader and his staff perform, what they do and how they make money to live and meet their families' needs. This worries and frightens society. We know that foreign movements have been involved in or been the basis of the ideology, principles and formation of many parties and are helping to keep them alive. We also know of the "disinterestedness" of many political and economic organizations in Europe and on other continents that are always prepared to export their ideology and methods to Third World countries. No one can say that they are truly disinterested; no one can guarantee that some day they will not "charge" us for their favors, at the expense of the entire country. No one can give assurances, moreover, that drug traffickers themselves, through political, financial, industrial or any other kind of organization, are not using their fortunes to help political parties in Bolivia or in any other country gain strength, stability, popularity and, ultimately, votes to take power.

Thus, the political parties must keep track of their income and expenditures, and since they are national organizations, groups established to serve the country and society, what better agency than the General Comptrollership of the Nation to check their accounts. This would imply that society trusts the political groups in which it believes and, as the case may be, the ones in which it places its trust through the vote.

Ideally, as in many developed countries, the government would allocate budgetary funds to the political parties. But since this is a vain illusion in our country, owing to the poverty with which we are struggling, we will have to resign ourselves to having each party survive through the contributions of its activists.

There are few, very few, political parties in our country that we can guarantee do not have contacts with foreign political or economic groups. Thus, it is to their advantage and to the advantage of those that depend on outsiders if the people trust in them, but through effective controls that clearly establish the origin of the immense fortunes that they spend, especially at election time.

8743

Pro Santa Cruz Committee Calls for Constitutional Reforms

33480076b *La Paz PRESENCIA in Spanish*
29 Jan 88 sec 2 p 1

[Text] Santa Cruz, 28 Jan (PRESENCIA)—The Pro Santa Cruz Committee has reiterated that a reform of the Political Constitution of the State is urgent, given the need to strengthen the democratic system and national cohesiveness through coexistence, unity and accomplishment.

This call was put forth by the president of the civic group, Carlos Dabdoub, during the opening session of the seminar on integration and democracy, decentralization and constitutional reform that was held last night at the committee's headquarters before a large crowd that included foreigners.

Referring to the lack of understanding of the phenomenon of "inevitable change" in the history of peoples on the part of those who have been responsible for governing them, Dabdoub asserted that this has given rise to a great deal of "political stupidity," with the resulting standstill in the search for better systems for running the government.

As a result, he asserted: "It is imperative in 1988 to study the mechanisms that will enable us to strengthen democracy and the national State through an analysis of a constitutional reform and by proposing relations of balanced coexistence among nation, region, society and individuals."

He noted that the new mechanisms designed to overcome this situation must avoid disdain for human rights, lack of respect for the regions and "the absorbing, reactionary centralism that fosters corruption."

In this regard, the Pro Santa Cruz Committee is putting forth the concept of a "new republic, created in the image and likeness of the common good, of true national sovereignty and of respect for the cultural identity of the regions, as a fundamental factor in the State Constitution."

As for reforming the constitution, he asserted that its central aim must be to consolidate the democratic system with clearly defined norms that will guarantee its

existence, "even if usurpers take power," by enshrining the right to disobey them and punishing those who use force or collaborate to this end."

Such a reform must embody the best of our past experience "to project into the future the possibility of a great and sovereign homeland, with the possibility of drawing up a broad pact of coexistence, provided that at all times the political, regional and ethical meaning of administrative judicial change is kept clear and precise."

Administrative decentralization, which is regarded as a fundamental requirement for consolidating democracy, based on proper civic involvement, must move forward without restrictions, bearing in mind that centralism is what holds back the development of participatory democracy.

Dabdoub pointed out that the Political Constitution sets forth a decentralized administrative model, but "it has never been complied with." He attributed this to the provisions of the constitution themselves, the concentration of power in the central government, and the arbitrariness of the Executive Branch in the area of taxation, among other reasons.

As a corollary to his address, the chairman of the civic committee stated:

"Let us vote for a new blueprint for the country, one of coexistence, union and accomplishment. If we have proclaimed peace, let us all begin to cultivate the ideology of solidarity and participation."

8743

Soviet \$200 Million Credit Warrants Closer Look, Says Editorial
33480076d La Paz PRESENCIA in Spanish
26 Jan 88 p 3

[Editorial: "A Soviet Loan and the Reality of Our Economy"]

[Text] A high-level official in the Foreign Relations Ministry has reported that the USSR is prepared to grant us a \$200 million loan, because it "understands" the situation in which the country finds itself owing to the depressed prices of the minerals that we export. He added that it may also purchase sugar surpluses.

A long time ago there was talk of the possibility of such a loan, which was tied to the provision of Soviet-made machinery and other items. This time the report says nothing in this regard and clarifies, rather, that the USSR would be willing to give the same "concessionary conditions" that other countries grant, that is to say, a maturity of no less than 15 years, a 5-year grace period and interest rates no higher than 2.5 percent a year, "in

other words, loans under the same conditions that the FRG, Japan, England, Spain and others have already granted and in free and immediately convertible dollars.

If the USSR accepts these conditions, as our ambassador in Moscow has reportedly been officially told, our authorities, especially those in the Foreign Ministry and the economic ministries, would do well to finalize all the details, so that the country can actually secure such a major loan, the use of which must be properly planned to avoid dispersions that lead nowhere, as experience has taught us.

Two hundred million dollars are valuable to any economy. Their importance is infinitely greater given the depressed conditions in which we are living owing both to the drop in our exports and to our excessive dependence on loans for quite some time now and because our nontraditional exports cannot, at least for the moment, expand.

We need to be certain that the \$200 million loan is actually in freely convertible currency, lest out of an urge to import everything we accept this loan in equipment, machinery and industrial production from the USSR, which, we must recognize, is bent on securing markets to diversify its exports.

If the transaction comes to pass, we will have to proceed very carefully and responsibly in using the loan, which in any case must benefit the sources of wealth so that as soon as possible they can create jobs, with the resulting decline in the high unemployment rates that we are facing.

8743

Paz Estenssoro's Son Scores 'Antinational' Economic Objectives
33480077b La Paz HOY in Spanish 24 Jan 88 p 7

[Interview with Ramiro Paz Cerruto; date and place not indicated]

[Text] [Question] You recently entered the field of politics with an article in the 12 September issue of PRESENCIA on the crisis and future of the MNR [Nationalist Revolutionary Movement]. What was your purpose?

[Answer] The article in question simply reflects a profound concern, which I feel many Bolivians share. It is the need to stabilize political life in Bolivia by strengthening party instruments that represent grassroots sentiments.

[Question] Don't you think that grassroots sentiments, as expressed at the recent municipal elections, have decreed the political death of the MNR?

[Answer] That is very possible. Though I wouldn't speak of death, but rather of a harsh blow that could be fatal because of how little the party can offer in the short time that it has left in office.

[Question] Why in the short time that it has left?

[Answer] Simply because 1989 will be an election year, which normally paralyzes the country as far as accomplishments that rally grassroots support are concerned. December is a dead month. Therefore, the MNR is looking at a countdown of practically 10 months. This is a very short period for the party to reorganize and change its unpopular image. But surprises are always possible.

[Question] So what would be left of the MNR after this term is over?

[Answer] Most importantly, the top echelon that is committed to the current economic policy would be left out. This would enable the party to develop new personnel in line with the unequivocal doctrine of Revolutionary Nationalism. Second, a large rural sector that is still committed to the MNR, albeit not organizationally, would be left. Last but not least, many leaders whom the current top echelon displaced but who have long political experience would be left.

[Question] Do you feel that the doctrine of Revolutionary Nationalism is represented by the Banners of April or by the current policy that the MNR is pursuing?

[Answer] The problem of doctrine must be placed beyond factional strife, because it belongs to the realm of national objectives. Bolivia is a country that is short of national objectives. The agrarian reform, the nationalization of the mines and the incorporation of the east are valuable measures because of what they represent in the formation of the nation over time. They cannot be judged on the basis of funds flowing from a state-run enterprise. For example, who could criticize peasant involvement in national life? Was this involvement a national objective or not?

Furthermore, was the nationalization of the mines, which represented the affirmation of our sovereignty over our natural resources, a national objective or not? Did the involvement of women through universal suffrage strengthen and identify with the nation's future or not? Was the incorporation of the east at an extraordinary cost financed by the nationalized mines, an act of territorial consolidation or not? The answer is yes in all cases.

[Question] Your assertions would be regarded as romantic or obsolete in administration circles. Don't you think so?

[Answer] I repeat. I think that the Banners of April are milestones in the consolidation of the nation. They are universal values that cannot be erased with a decree born of opportunism. Now then, I also feel that the measures that arose from 1952 should have been consolidated within a framework of economic rationality. Furthermore, I think that this was the trend in 1964 when the MNR government was overthrown under the influence of the same interest groups that now control the government. I know these people and of course I do not expect applause. Rather, their negative opinion flatters me.

[Question] And what about the current economic policy?

[Answer] I think that it got bogged down in a temporary control of hyperinflation. But if we analyze the rest of its objectives, they could be regarded as antinational. This policy is leaving us with a ruined productive structure and with an artificial economy manipulated by drug traffickers, smugglers and a few corrupt public officials.

[Question] What will the MNR's future be in 1989?

[Answer] In the short time it has left, it has to choose between renewal and continuing as an appendage to a government that is practically over and done with. I feel that part of the corrupt upper echelon will seek a place in the ADN [Nationalist Democratic Action]. However, if it opts for renewal, its leaders who are not committed to the economic policy and its activists will seek alliances with rising parties like the 9 April Vanguard, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement of the Left, the MIN, Democratic Left and other groups that are also keeping the spirit of Revolutionary Nationalism alive.

8743

Judicial Branch Terms Budget Allocation 'Ridiculous'

33480076c La Paz PRESENCIA in Spanish
29 Jan 88 sec 2 p 3

[Text] Sucre, 28 Jan (PRESENCIA)—"Bolivian society will continue to suffer the scourge of delayed trials, and justice will remain slow as long as the administration fails to respect the financial autonomy of the Judiciary, because we do not accept the ridiculous sum of 18 million bolivianos that the Finance Ministry has projected in the nation's general budget."

This comment was made by the chief justice of the nation's Supreme Court, Dr Guillermo Caballero Saucedo, who told PRESENCIA today that the country's judicial activities would again face serious obstacles of all sorts, including the lack of appropriate infrastructure at the various superior courts and a shortage of judges to expedite the various proceedings.

"In line with the prerogatives that the Political Constitution of the State accords it, the Judiciary has drafted its budget independently, as the other branches of government have done, and has requested that the administration allocate it 76 million bolivianos. The Finance Ministry, however, has set aside just 18 million bolivianos, which we consider a ridiculous sum given that it represents only 0.72 percent of the entire general budget of the nation."

On account of this situation, he announced that a five-magistrate delegation from the Supreme Court of Justice would travel next Monday to La Paz to talk with the president and vice president of the republic and with representatives of the chambers of deputies and senators and outline to them the position of the Judiciary: "We understand the country's economic situation. We can negotiate, but we want them to respect the financial autonomy of this branch of government," Caballero stated.

Under the Judiciary's own budget, according to the chief justice, 300 more judges will be appointed throughout the country, so as to "hasten the trials that have been pending for years." "We cannot continue to accept a dreadful disproportion between the number of cases and the number of judges. In La Paz there are 46 judges for 900,000 inhabitants. A similar situation exists in Santa Cruz and Cochabamba."

8743

Church-Sponsored Poll Results on Peasant Situation Assessed

33480076a La Paz PRESENCIA in Spanish
29 Jan 88 sec 2 p 8

[Text]

Bolivia: Summary of the Diagnosis of the National Peasant Survey

Introduction

In August 1987 the National Executive Commission for the Visit of the Holy Father gave its approval to a National Peasant Survey that would serve as the groundwork for a diagnosis of the year-to-year situation of Bolivia's peasants. In November 1987 the Peasant Pastoral Commission approved the "preliminary summary" of the National Peasant Survey.

The present document is a corrected summary of that summary, preceded by a list of some important statistical data.

Basic Data

1. Bolivia became a republic on 6 August 1825. It has a surface area of 2 million square kilometers and an extensive coastline on the Pacific.

2. Successive military conflicts have reduced its area to just 1 million square kilometers (1,098,581) and have deprived it of its own outlet to the sea.

3. Some 65.4 percent of Bolivian territory consists of extensive eastern plains that are practically unpopulated. The remaining 34.6 percent is valleys and high plateaus, where 80 percent of the population lives, in particular the ancient Quechua and Aymara peoples, who are in the majority.

4. The population of Bolivia (about 7 million) accounts for just 1.6 percent of the total population of the Latin American subcontinent. Nevertheless, the almost 4 million rural inhabitants account for 3.44 percent of Latin America's peasants.

5. About 1.3 million hectares are farmed in Bolivia each year. The peasants farm 1.2 million of them, and the "enterprises" just 100,000.

6. Bolivia's vast territory and small population (6.7 inhabitants per square kilometer), its scant and poor roads (less than 40,000 kilometers, of which just 1,700 are paved) and its 3,643 kilometers of railway lines...are indicators of the country's severe backwardness.

7. Rural infant mortality is alarming: 4 of every 10 peasant children die before the age of 2.

8. All Bolivian peasants live in poverty-stricken conditions; that is to say, they cannot meet even 70 percent of their basic food requirements. One-fifth of Bolivian peasants live in extreme poverty; in other words, they cannot meet even 30 percent of their basic food requirements.

9. Before hyperinflation and the current administration's policy of stabilization, poverty in Bolivia was primarily concentrated in rural areas:

—66.7 percent of the poor in Bolivia were peasants.

—88.9 percent of the indigent in Bolivia were peasants.

—93.3 percent of the extremely indigent in Bolivia were peasants.

10. From 1953 to 1980 the National Agrarian Reform Council distributed a total of 36 million hectares, only 4 million hectares to 550,000 peasant-production units and 32 million hectares to the "enterprises."

11. The peasants, with only 4 million hectares, grow 70 percent of the food that we eat in Bolivia. Meanwhile, the enterprises, with 32 million hectares, grow 20 percent of the food, with the remaining 10 percent coming from imports.

12. The land is obviously becoming concentrated in large estates again. The peasants have little land, which is poor, but they work almost all of it, while the "enterprises" own about one-third of the nation's territory and do not work the land.

13. There are now about 4,000 peasant communities scattered all over the country, but there is no law to protect them.

14. More than 100,000 peasant-production units (families) do not own deeds to their lands.

15. All of Bolivia's peasants are organized in unions and a decade ago formed the Single Trade Union Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB), which comprises 500,000 families.

16. In 1983, at a congress attended by more than 2,500 peasant delegates, the CSUTCB passed a Fundamental Agrarian Bill (LAF) based on the following principles:

- The land for those who work it themselves
- Strengthening of the peasant communities
- Organizational and administrative autonomy for the peasant communities
- Community organization of labor

17. The presence of the Bolivian Catholic Church in rural Bolivia is very important, whether in the form of pastoral agents or institutions that support peasant development.

18. Paradoxically, the Bolivian church does not have a national peasant-pastoral body. Therefore, the Bolivian church has never issued a document specifically about the problems of the peasants. It is high time that it did.

19. Bolivia's peasants, in particular the Aymaras, the Quechuas and the indigenous groups in the east, are the backbone of our history and are the lifeblood of our nationhood.

20. The educational and cultural policies that have endeavored to make the country and its population uniform and homogeneous have failed so far. Bolivia is a multicultural, multiethnic and multilingual society. Its potential for development, change and liberation lies in its diversity, not in homogeneity.

The Major Conclusions of the National Peasant Survey

1. Religious

The non-Catholic churches and the many sects that now abound in the countryside are helping to create divisions among the peasants who belong to the communities.

There is great hope that the visit of Pope John Paul II will lead to real improvements in the oppressive and unjust living conditions among peasants.

2. Cultural

The peasants are demanding a fundamental change in the nature and content of Bolivian education and are calling on the government both to increase spending on education and, at the same time, to respect the native cultures and to provide bilingual education.

Bolivian peasants show great interest in preserving their customs, their language and their values, at the same time reaffirming their deep-seated feelings of belonging to the homeland.

3. Organizational

In general they are thankful that their traditional organizations are changing and that the importance and representativeness of the union are growing. In many cases the union has replaced the traditional organizations. Bolivian peasants believe that the unions ought to assume increasing responsibilities.

4. Economic

Only 26 percent of the communities interviewed said that all or most of the families have deeds of ownership to their parcels.

Moreover, the majority of Bolivian peasants do not have access to economically productive land.

There are collectively owned lands in about half of the rural Bolivian communities.

The majority of Bolivian peasants complain that they have never received credit from the government, but at the same time they voice great mistrust about owing money to a bank.

The temporary exodus of peasants seeking a livelihood outside their communities is a way of life. Lately many have gone to coca-growing areas. This uproots and breaks up the communities.

Bolivian peasants are indeed aware that they are the main growers of the country's food and that their output is constantly threatened, particularly by the current economic policy of encouraging imports.

The self-managed peasant enterprise CORACA is present in 26 percent of the communities interviewed, and the peasants do appreciate its services, although they also underscore its problems and limitations.

5. Political

Opinion among Bolivia's peasants is divided between those who say that their political involvement in the December 1987 municipal elections will not bring them any benefits and those who think that it will.

There is a persistent, deep-rooted idea that the political parties are deceiving and using them and that supporting them will not change their situation at all. Therefore, they emphasize the strengthening of their unions, which they describe as democratic and which they themselves control.

Bolivian peasants look favorably on the possibility of setting up rural municipalities in their communities.

It is obvious to the peasants that democracy and dictatorship are at odds, but according to them democracy must mean not only political participation but social and economic involvement as well.

They persistently describe the current administration as anti-peasant, authoritarian and repressive.

6. Social

The most common diseases and the major causes of infant mortality on the continent (4 of every 10 peasant children die before reaching age 2) are: tuberculosis, rheumatism, parasitosis, respiratory disorders, diarrhea and anemia.

The peasants are well aware that the best way to counter disease is to eat properly. Surprisingly, they do not demand "peasant social security."

No peasant school has taught normal classes during the 1987 school year. Half of the school year has been lost owing to the government's failure to pay and to teacher strikes.

Housing among Bolivian peasants consists of two- or three-room adobe huts with dirt floors and straw roofs. Very few have installed galvanized iron roofing sheets.

8743

**Sarney Views Constitution, Military Role,
Economic Problems**

33420047 Brasilia CORREIO BRAZILIENSE
in Portuguese 6 Jan 88 pp 4, 5

[Interview with President Jose Sarney by Special Correspondent Marilda Mascarenhas at Sao Luis, Maranhao, on or about 1 January 1988; first paragraph is CORREIO BRAZILIENSE introduction; second through fifth paragraphs, and boxed material, are comment by interviewer]

[Text] "Everything will be different in 1988." That is the promise made by President Jose Sarney in an exclusive interview granted to CORREIO BRAZILIENSE. He said he will not cease being a politician ("I shall die a politician," he declared) but intends—in this new year—not be so closely attached and committed to politicians as he was last year. Sarney also said he is tired of attempting to accommodate the politicians and reconcile "factions that were not interested in being reconciled." These frank comments were made to reporter Marilda Mascarenhas, who laid siege to the president during his retreat in Sao Luis until she got from him an interview—recorded on both sides of a cassette tape—focusing on each of the periods of his administration, point by point. Sarney did not speak exclusively of politics, however; he confessed that he is collecting data for his autobiography.

During the first year of his administration, President Jose Sarney confronted—and succeeded in disuniting—two powerful enemies: an "out-of-date Left" that planned to take power with the help of a social convulsion, and "a retrograde Right" that was betting on a collapse of the civilian government and a return of reactionary groups "that had never lost the desire to rule." Harassed by these two adversaries—and uncertain how to proceed in a presidency conferred on him by the hand of fate, Sarney considered calling direct elections immediately to transfer power to another politician. He backed off, however, after coming to the conclusion that the nation would be plunged into a wave of retrogression; proceeded to confront his enemies; and today, 3 years later, is convinced that he has already recorded the greatest achievement of his administration: the consolidation of civilian authority.

"I am absolutely certain that history will pass judgment on this period," the president declared. "When it does, it will find that although we didn't do all we might have, we at least did everything that was necessary to spare our country the frustration of having its quest for democracy cut short at my hands," the president declared.

During the 13 days he stayed in Maranhao to rest over Christmas and New Year's Day, Sarney did everything possible to avoid contact with journalists. "I am on a spiritual retreat; please excuse me," was the message he sent to the press representatives who were besieging him at Calhau Beach in Sao Luis and on Curupu Island, 30 km from the capital of Maranhao.

Sarney made an exception for the present interview. Availing himself of the access he has to the president on Curupu, Antonio Carlos Lima, editor in chief of the daily O ESTADO DO MARANHAO (which Sarney founded and his family owns), facilitated the task. Lima hitched a ride on an FAB [Brazilian Air Force] helicopter and—armed with a recorder, cassette tape, and a tablet with the questions I had prepared—he undertook to obtain the interview. At day's end he returned with wonderful news for a reporter who was eager for a presidential "deposition" during a period of slim pickings for all the journalists assigned to cover Sao Luis: the news that Sarney had already begun the recording of the interview.

[Question] Mr President, after 3 years in power, what feeling today best defines your relationship with the nation? Do you feel fulfilled, frustrated, disappointed, or dissatisfied.... How do you feel?

[Answer] I feel as if—in a knife fight, a tremendous struggle—I had remained untouched and true to myself. Power has in no way changed me, just as it has never enticed me. One does not argue with destiny; destiny is a fact. Bismark said that politics is the art of the possible, and as an intellectual I do believe that the presidency is a great political experience, but for me it has been a great human experience. Politics lives on realities; we who hold the office of president must therefore struggle with our own realities.

[Question] Going back to the time—more precisely, to the night—that you learned you would have to assume the duties of the presidency, because of the disability of President Tancredo Neves: Did you at any time actually fear becoming president? I would appreciate it if you would try to reconstruct to some extent your thoughts and feelings during those decisive days....

[Answer] Fear, no; great emotion, yes—but more because of Tancredo's suffering than because of my own uncertainty. I was perhaps the last person to believe that Tancredo was going to die. When that possibility became clear to me, however, I felt a great responsibility. I had a precise idea of the difficulties that awaited me in this presidential term. I knew how difficult it would be to govern a country like Brazil, at a moment of transition and without the definition of a minimum program to be implemented. But I have never been afraid to do my duty.

[Question] What were your first days as president like, in view of the fact that you have always said you were placed in this situation by the hand of fate? Did you at any moment consider disregarding fate and abandoning your mission?

[Answer] I never at any moment considered abandoning the mission that fate had to me. I did indeed consider scheduling elections immediately, but when I studied the ramifications of such a decision I determined that it

would be impossible, because it would amount to a step backward for the nation. Such a decision would be construed as a renunciation of my responsibilities—and above all as a course leading to a devastated land—because I was convinced that if I took that course, we would not achieve the transition and retrogression would result.

After my election I prepared myself to be vice president of the Republic. I read everything I could lay my hands on concerning that office, and primarily the post-Mondale studies that were made in the United States on the subject of the vice-presidency. For this very reason I had a definite idea of the difficulties involved in governing large groups of people. No country in the world today is free from the tendency toward ungovernability. I had to govern with a government that had not been chosen by me, without a clearly defined program, without homogeneous political parties, having to overcome the resistance of hostile groups both inside and outside the Democratic Alliance.

[Question] What was the first serious problem that came across your desk, and at what moment did you really become aware of what it meant to administer a country as huge—and as replete with contrasts—as Brazil?

[Answer] The most serious problem was always the institutional problem: the problem of consolidating the transition to democracy, of ending my term in office with a democratized country. It was the problem of resisting a leftist minority that was extremely radical and out-of-date: a minority that strove for—and had as its objective—destabilization, in the belief that it could, and can, take power through the disintegration of society and through clamorous social upheaval—the kind of “broth” necessary for a social revolution in the style of the turn of the century.

On the other hand you had a retrograde Right that was betting on the collapse of the civilian government and therefore on the return of extremely reactionary groups that had never lost the desire to rule. I believe that we succeeded in overcoming this confrontation through the affirmation of the civilian government in the first year of our term in office, by resolving conflicts and at the same time consolidating the political authority, which is the synthesis of all authority.

[Question] Mr President, what would you single out as positive—and as negative—in the first year of your term? And what has changed in this evaluation, 2 years later?

[Answer] The most positive thing in the first year of my administration was certainly the affirmation of the principle of political authority and the consolidation of the beginning of the process of the transition to democracy. All the commitments we had made with respect to democratization of the nation were fulfilled. We held the freest of elections for mayor of the state capitals; held

elections for the municipalities that bore the National Security classification; and opened the Ministry of Labor to the total exercise of freedom for the working class. We reformed all the political laws. I personally was determined that these parties should not only become legal again but that they should not suffer any discrimination. I believe this was a decisive and positive development.

As for the negative aspect, I believe that we experienced—in the first year of our administration—the instability inherent in any process of this nature—in any transition process. Amid much turmoil we had to manage almost 2,000 strikes. In the economic domain, we made the mistake of freezing the charges for public services and of not reaching the correct decision as to what we should do at that moment with respect to the problem of the foreign debt.

[Question] Mr President, your second year in office was a decisive one. You had the Cruzado Plan, a unique phenomenon in the history of our country, principally as it pertained to mobilization of the public; and you had the Cruzado II Plan. What was the real reason for the failure of plan? Who, Mr President, prejudiced the plan, which at the outset, at least, had every prospect for success?

[Answer] I gave much thought to the question of adopting the Cruzado Plan. In the first days of my administration I spoke with Sayad and asked him to send an emissary to Israel to check on the experiment being carried out there in the form of an unorthodox modification of the economic process.

Sayad sent the economist Persio Arida, who spent several days in Israel and brought us an extremely pessimistic account of what was happening there. This did not discourage us. On the contrary, we asked Minister Sayad to continue the search for an idea—for a different way, outside the bounds of orthodoxy, for us to deal with the economic problem. I knew that it was an extremely difficult decision—that the decision I would be taking, which ran a very great risk of failure, placed my neck definitely on the block. In the end, however, I decided that we would make the changes—and they were fundamental changes—that resulted in the Cruzado Plan.

I believe that one day—after its time has passed—the Cruzado Plan will be analyzed without the strong feelings, and that it will have an important and decisive place in the nation's economic history, especially when you take into account what should be done and what should not be done. And it did yield some results. Unfortunately, we were besieged in a brutal manner by those who—motivated by the desire for power—did not want the Cruzado Plan to succeed.

We had to race the resistance of the Far Left, which is totally retrograde and though a minority is an active one; it adopted a strike strategy as a means of destabilizing the Cruzado Plan. We had more than 2,000 strikes that

year as well. The fact is, however, that if—with prices frozen—we then reduced production and increased wages, that process would inevitably destabilize the Cruzado Plan. On the other hand you had the business sectors, especially those who want a market economy without open competition and who preach an 18th Century brand of economic liberalism; they fought against the Cruzado Plan and made every effort to destabilize it by causing shortages and speculation and by opposing the government in every way. For the first time, therefore, capital and labor were—paradoxically—united in opposition to the government, thereby demonstrating the primitive nature of our political process.

We succeeded in getting the most retrograde sectors of Brazilian capitalism to oppose us, and also succeeded in getting them to unite with the most retrograde elements of the progressive forces of the nation.

The Cruzado Plan failed because it received no help, no political support. The politicians never understood what exactly the Cruzado Plan was, and the plan may perhaps have been hurt by the elections we held that year. The politicians desired only electoral advantage. Contrary to what it might appear to be at first glance, the public mobilization—the support that we received for the Cruzado Plan—was the spontaneous support of the people; it was not organized support.

The Cruzado Plan consistently met with hard-core resistance from the organized groups of the nation—from both sides, as I have said. As for the Cruzado II Plan, that was a mistake. Because of the difficulties that the Cruzado Plan had been facing, Minister Funaro lost a large part of his staff and became isolated. This caused him to accept Cruzado II, which was a technical mistake. None of the premises that we attempted to achieve with Cruzado II was borne out.

And as Vinner has said, there is nothing more terrible in politics than a hypothesis that is contradicted by the facts. In other words, I recognize that the Cruzado II Plan was a major tactical error and a major strategic frustration.

[Question] Your popularity—the greatest that a president ever had in history—declined sharply after the second plan. You said that a tactical and strategic error was made. Who, Mr President, was responsible for that error?

[Answer] Paul Quirk, a U.S. professor of political science, says—in his article entitled “What Must a President Know?”—that the presidency is the most difficult job in the world, and that the task of a president has become not only difficult but impossible to accomplish. The prospects for a successful presidency—in today’s world—are very remote.

As for who is responsible for this error, I offer the classic response: when we are successful, it is everyone’s success; but in the case of failure, only the president—the head of state—is responsible. This rule is invariable.

[Question] After all this, did you at any time consider abandoning your mission?

[Answer] At no time did I consider abandoning my mission. The presidency has also been a great learning experience for me. I have a good sense of history, and it is with that vision of history that I am exercising the presidency of the Republic. I do not linger over the small details, the minor annoyances, or the major difficulties. I view the office realistically, and in my opinion the presidency—the job of governing Brazil—is an exceptional honor that is open to any citizen but is an opportunity that has come to few Brazilians throughout history. It is therefore not possible to complain about—or deal with—this problem from a personal standpoint. No; one must face the difficulties in the knowledge that someone has to take responsibility for the nation’s destiny, and if we are that someone, then we must continue to perform our duties within the parameters of reality, which is the raw material for our labor.

[Question] Mr President, is there a residue of resentment from this experience of 3 years in the presidency?

[Answer] I believe I have already answered that question. I feel no resentment; I’m not one to hold a grudge. My ability not to hold a grudge is absolute; I do not harbor resentment toward anyone. I am a committed Christian and am therefore personally able to overcome these difficulties, even though I live my life with a great passion—the quest for excellence—something that puts me under constant tension.

Today, I am absolutely certain that history will pass judgment on this period. When it does, it will find that although we didn’t do all we might have, we at least did everything that was necessary to spare our country the frustration of having its quest for democracy cut short at my hands.

[Question] The third year of your term, Mr President, began with the convening of the Constituent Assembly, which was a source of great hope for the people. After 1 year the new constitution was not ready, and the preliminary draft of that document succeeded in displeasing everyone. What were your hopes with respect to this constitution? What kind of constitution did you believe would be the ideal one for the nation?

[Answer] The Constituent Assembly was convened in fulfillment of a campaign promise made by Tancredo and subsequently by all of us. Unfortunately, the Constituent Assembly underwent a change in the form of its organization. The Committee on Systematization was unable to function as a committee on systematization; it renounced everyone of the decisions of the agenda

committees and thwarted the will of the people. Popular changes in the bylaws were adopted—changes that served no purpose other than demagoguery, inasmuch as none of them was accepted or studied in depth and the preliminary draft of the Constitution turned out to be a draft that did not express the will of the majority of the members of the Constituent Assembly. This is the impasse into which the Constituent Assembly was thrust, and the resulting situation is very bad for all of us.

The nation has high hopes with respect to the new constitution. I believe we should have presented the proposal of the Afonso Arinos Committee and appointed a committee of review that would send a preliminary draft to the congress for consideration as a working document. It would have been better that way, for we would be producing a homogeneous constitution that would be a legal monument of the nation, that would represent an important era, that would be an instrument for mobilization of the national conscience. It would be a progressive constitution that expresses social rights—a Constitution that would give the nation the conditions for opening the way to modernity rather than a constitution characterized by resentments, a casuistical constitution, a constitution that looks toward the past rather than toward the future.

[Question] You have complained a great deal of a lack of political support, principally from your own party, the PMDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement Party]. What was there about your relations with the political parties, and why did they deteriorate?

[Answer] As I have already stated, my major effort was to draw closer to the PMDB—to unite with it—so that we might, as one great party, support the process of transition. However, the PMDB is a party of various factions, including some that are even antithetical. And after the election, several wings of the party deemed it more important to take power immediately than truly to fulfill our commitments to the transition to democracy—and to normality—in our country.

[Question] Mr President, the members of the Constituent Assembly spent a lot of time discussing the question of your term in office. Do you think that is truly an important question?

[Answer] It is my perception that—as I had anticipated—the question of the presidential term became the preoccupation of the entire Constituent Assembly, to the detriment of its work. I believe this is not an important issue, however, among other things because if the Constituent Assembly had taken a different course, that would have greatly facilitated the conclusion of the process of the transition to democracy. But the vision of power became much more compelling than the vision of the national interest, on the part of one segment of the constituent Assembly—the segment that became the visible portion of that body, albeit the minority portion.

[Question] Mr President, one of the most important achievements of your administration is in the area of foreign policy, as it relates to Latin neighbors. What developments do you anticipate from this policy that you initiated?

[Answer] I believe that Brazil's success in the area of foreign policy stems from the fact that I was in a position to carry out foreign policy without the restrictions imposed on me by domestic policy. In the area of domestic policy my hands were completely tied; I couldn't make a move, couldn't make decisions. The administration did not belong to me: we had no program, merely a brief agenda, the "Manifesto to the Nation" of the Democratic Alliance. Foreign policy had already been a concern of mine for many years in my capacity as a member of congress; and I had adopted a position—the one we are now implementing, which calls for the integration of Latin America—because I have always believed that the time has passed when we could continue to believe that we would be saved through help from the great powers. Latin America's frustration in its quest for a Marshall Plan must come to an end. What we must do is save ourselves through our own resources, and I am merely giving effect to this formula, through the instrumentality of our unity. I believe that Bolivar's dream of a united Latin America can be translated into a modern vision involving integration, a common market, and a policy of Latin American unity.

[Question] Mr President, you have always said that the role of the Armed Forces has been of vital importance for the process of transition in our country. Have you at any time experienced any kind of pressure from the military?

[Answer] I believe that the role of the Armed Forces was—and is—an extremely important one for the transition to democracy. Were it not for the position they took, it would be impossible for us to overcome the nation's difficulties and complete this democratic project; if they had been disunited, we would have found our process aborted a long time ago. Moreover, I have always believed that the transition should be made in concert with the military rather than in opposition to the military. We need to put an end to this feeling of resentment, because we are all Brazilians and should realize that the Armed Forces have their essential role, which is to defend the nation's institutions, law, and order—in accordance with the law and subject to political authority—and to fulfill their constitutional mission. This is the desire of the Armed Forces, and they are fulfilling their role with total dedication. I have never experienced any kind of pressure from the military; quite the contrary.

None of the orders that I have given as commander in chief has ever been carried out with any reservations.

[Question] Mr President, the nation is once again experiencing difficult times with respect to the economy. Three ministers of finance have already served in your administration, and apparently none of them found the right answer. Why is finding a solution to Brazil's economic problems so difficult?

[Answer] Finding a solution to the problems of the economy is a difficult task not only for Brazil; it is difficult for the entire world. The whole world is passing through a serious economic crisis. You need only look at what happened on the stock exchanges. This crisis is so serious that it has succeeded in disrupting the powerful exchanges of New York, London, Tokyo, Paris, and all the major countries.

It is my belief that Brazil is not accustomed to coping with difficulties. There is a tendency for us to view each difficulty that arises as a catastrophe. Moreover, partisan political interests—combined with the possibility of elections in the near future—have caused us to carry pessimism to an extreme and thereby create a disposition to believe that Brazil is a nation without hope—that Brazil is a lost cause—when that is not true. This a great country. One need only recall that in the midst of the greatest difficulties we had a record harvest and increased the rate of employment.

If we have been unsuccessful in dealing with inflation, it is because inflation has flared up again throughout Latin America. Although Brazil is an extremely viable country—a country that has a great future—it is politically profitable to create a feeling of chaos, because a feeling of chaos gives rise to an attitude of protest, to a rhetoric of disaster, and ultimately to great political advantage for those who are thinking only of getting elected without giving a thought to the Brazilian people.

[Question] Mr President, after the experience of your 3 years in office, what kind of changes in position do you plan to make in your fourth year? You have complained a great deal about a lack of freedom to govern. What changes—at the governmental level—are you contemplating in order to be able to work freely in 1988, without political pressures or interference?

[Answer] After 3 years in office, I obviously have had some in mind.... The year 1987 was an extremely important one in my life, because I was able to taste the bitterness of great injustice without its being able to change me or have an effect on me: without my having at any time to make decisions in the absence of an atmosphere of calm and patience—virtues which at certain moments are also essential for governing.

I therefore believe that this is precisely the reason why I am a great devotee of nonviolence, and one of the greatest admirers of the truly extraordinary figure of Gandhi. Gandhi said something very important: he said we must have a structure sufficient to enable us to

struggle with injustice—must know that injustice exists but not let it affect us—for otherwise we shall be playing into the hands of those who are unjust.

I therefore anticipate that at the governmental level I shall be able to work in 1988 with greater freedom and without major pressures or interference. I shall not cease being a politician; I shall die a politician, for I have always said that politics has only an entrance and no exit. However, I plan in this year of 1988 not to be so closely attached and committed to politicians as I was previously, in my attempt to accommodate the politicians and reconcile factions that were not interested in being reconciled.

[Question] Mr President, what have your moments of leisure been like? Have you been able to forget your concerns, or have you felt tension, depression, or stress?

[Answer] At no moment have I ceased to have concerns, because of my strong sense of responsibility. My tension, when I feel it, is an inner striving for excellence, for self-improvement. My unhappy days—as Ovidio said—never cause me to lose faith in things. They do give me concern, in view of the very difficulty of overcoming the difficulties. Stress... stress is the disease of the modern world, and we all suffer from it. It doesn't help for the doctor to say that we must rest and stop worrying, because that doesn't happen. Tancredo was in the habit of quoting Chateaubriand, who said that we have all the eternity to rest in. I believe that the stress of the modern world also has eternity as its only remedy. We are living in a stressful world.

Industrial society has created material values. It has not created spiritual values, however, and it has therefore managed to create the most uncomfortable comfort that man has ever invented in all of human history.

[Question] Mr President, what do you think you have won or lost during these 3 years, as a person and as a president of Brazil?

[Answer] Everyone knows that I never thought of becoming president of the Republic, and in that connection I am extremely grateful for the experience that I have been accorded. I regard myself as a better human being today than when I assumed the presidency of the republic. Above all, I am today a more understanding person, with a more transcendental vision of myself and of Brazil. I am a believer; I harbor no doubt with respect to God.

[Question] Here's a question that isn't very original, Mr President. If you were to begin over again, what would you refrain from doing, or what would you do that you didn't do—or didn't succeed in doing?

[Answer] People always say that if they had to start over again, they would do everything differently. That view assumes that people will actually do what reality enables them to do. I must say, however, that if I had to start

over again I would not do some things that I did do; would do other things that I did not do; and would be sorry there were some things that I was unable to do.

[Question] In conclusion, what has changed in the life of poet, writer, friend, father, husband, and Brazilian citizen Jose Sarney in these past 3 years?

[Answer] My life has changed completely. The poet has undoubtedly been restrained, but he does not let a day pass without pledging his troth to poetry. I would ask only that she await my return, and that she continue to weave—during this long wait—the fabric of our lives.

As a prose writer, I believe that the presidency is providing me with the opportunity to accumulate a collection of experiences and events that will contribute toward a future literary effort—undoubtedly an autobiography, a book about my experience in government. In my capacity as father, husband, and citizen, these 3 years have involved my family—which has always been very close, with a very strong sense of solidarity and a Christian vision of life—in such a way that it came to be dominated by a desire to help me fulfill my mission successfully.

[Box, p 5: "The Secret Is: Never Give Up"]

The idea of becoming a political reporter never crossed my mind. But the opportunity was a rare one indeed: an interview with the president of the Republic—or an attempt to obtain the interview. Moreover, I also always believed the city of Sao Luis should never be separated from work. It is a splendid city, a city meant to be experienced intensively, even if it is the week over New Year's following a year—and a Christmas—of hard work. I accordingly landed in Sao Luis prepared to use all my powers of persuasion—as politicians are so skilled at doing—to obtain at least the opportunity to talk with the president about my intentions.

My first telephone call in Sao Luis was to Antonio Carlos—or "Pipoca," as the president himself calls him. We had worked together 4 years ago on the same newspaper that he manages today. I learned a lot working with him; we went so far as to essay several journalistic exploits in Maranhao, but this one was even more daring. Pipoca was very frank with me: He believed it would be difficult. I never considered giving up. My first victory came when I induced him to go alone to Curupu Island, as a kind of messenger. Pipoca hitched a ride on the FAB helicopter, armed with recorder, questions, and a note from me to the president. At day's end he returned with good news and a message: Sarney would not break the rule—a rule that he himself had established—that he would not take journalists to his place of repose, but he was willing to grant me the interview.

The next 3 days were days of great tension, with no news either about the interview or about the recorder, which had been borrowed from my friend Cesar Teixeira. What

would the president do? What would it be like, replying to questions via a recorder? Relief came only when Sarney returned to Sao Luis. In the course of an informal conversation—and amid the questions of the journalists present—I asked the president in a low voice: "Mr President, what about my interview?" "It's ready," he replied. "Come by later." I left the president's house and went straight to the beach, where I ate a delicious fish stew. From there, as I gazed at the city, I could see that even while at work Sao Luis is a marvelous sight to see.

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Guimaraes Comments on Possible Candidacy

Tour Boosts Stature

33420060b Sao Paulo GAZETA MERCANTIL
in Portuguese 21 Jan 88 p 6

[Text] Congressman Ulysses Guimaraes acknowledged yesterday in Florianopolis that he could be a candidate for president of Brazil if the PMDB asks him to run. In that roundabout way so typical of his style of speaking, Guimaraes said that he would be ready to answer the PMDB call "if the party believes that I should undertake that mission."

It was the first time that the man who is chairman of both the PMDB and the National Constituent Assembly has openly considered the possibility of a candidacy. He repeatedly denies, however, that this intention of his has anything to do with the national tour on which he has just embarked, during which he will visit the PMDB governors. Yesterday he met with Pedro Ivo Campos, governor of Santa Catarina.

"It's too early to talk about it," Guimaraes says whenever he is asked whether he would be a candidate for the presidency. His argument is, therefore, that no major topic of fundamental importance on the political scene should be raised right now, because it could divert attention from the National Constituent Assembly. Despite Guimaraes' attempt to keep his tour of the states free from any electoral campaign connotations, it is obvious, as Congressman Nelson Jobim (PMDB-RS) says, that stronger support for his candidacy is one of the results of the trip.

"It is clear that candidacy is not among the reasons for his visits to the various states. It does seem, however, to be a consequence of it," says Jobim. The southern congressman even suspects that Guimaraes will soon lean toward holding presidential elections this year. Jobim has aligned himself with those congressman who voted for a 4-year term during the meetings of the Constituent Assembly's Systematization Committee.

Another of Guimaraes' companions on his foray into the South, Ibsen Pinheiro (RS), PMDB leader in the House of Deputies, seems convinced that the party has no other candidate. To Pinheiro, who voted for a 5-year term,

"Ulysses is more than a PMDB candidate—he is the national unity candidate...The profile of the next president of Brazil already includes a photo, with a name clearly inscribed below it, and it's 'Doctor' Ulysses," "insists this southern congressman.

During the press conference that followed his meeting with Governor Pedro Ivo Campos, Guimaraes was urged to express his hunch as to whether the plenary session of the Constituent Assembly would vote for a 4-year or a 5-year presidential term of office. Guimaraes said he is not in the habit of giving tips, not even in the numbers game.

He emphasized, however, that despite the fact that the amendment calling for a 5-year term had received more than 280 signatures, "the function of the plenary session is not to ratify; it is not a bureaucratic rubber stamp." That statement was interpreted as yet another indication that Guimaraes is no longer a staunch defender of the 5-year term.

Guimaraes was also vehement in ruling out the possibility of inverting the agenda of the Constituent Assembly to facilitate an immediate vote on the topics related to the presidential term of office and the system of government.

He believes that rule changing is something that has been eliminated from the Constituent Assembly. "I am going to bring the matter to a vote without waiting for an amendment to be submitted."

Guimaraes Acts Like a Candidate

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese
10 Feb 88 p 4

[Article by Carlos Chagas]

[Text] He has the face of a candidate, the look of a candidate, and he talks like a candidate. The one who answers this description and who engaged in a lengthy conversation with a group of journalists that extended into the wee hours of yesterday morning was Congressman Ulysses Guimaraes. On Monday, after having disposed of his business with key presidential advisors, arranged a meeting of the ministers in the social area, traveled with them to Rio and Petropolis to visit the regions affected by the floods, and returned to Planalto Palace for a long discussion with 40 leaders of the National Constituent Assembly, the acting president of the Republic still had enough energy left for 4 hours of conversations with the press.

Jovial, sarcastic, and attentive to all the focal points of conversation, yet without granting a formal interview, he dealt with current issues. He is certainly a candidate, even though he has merely smiled when faced with specific questions on the topic. He looks like he is already on the campaign trail for presidential elections which, as he predicted, will probably take place this year

"despite the fact that the two schools of thought—one in favor of 4 years for Sarney, the other backing a 5-year term—have seen their support go up and down like a seesaw."

Ulysses said that the country needs to stop being afraid of elections. In his view, election is a solution, never a problem. Therefore, recognizing that the Constituent Assembly today is leaning more toward giving Sarney a 4-year term, he answered that the PMDB is fully capable of electing a successor.

The important thing is to have a candidate that can unite the party and polarize the electorate. He doesn't believe the grim predictions about the country going into a convulsion if presidential elections are held this year. There will be plenty of time to hold them after the new Constitution takes effect. The head of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, Oscar Correia, has already said so. Things were much worse in 1945 in terms of dire predictions and everything turned out all right: the Vargas dictatorship fell on 29 October and the presidential and congressional elections were held on 2 December.

The chairman of the National Constituent Assembly gave his prescription for being a good president of the Brazil: Set four or five basic goals and achieve them. None of this trying to solve all the nation's problems down to the last detail. That was what Juscelino Kubitschek did, and this formula is even more applicable now. Whatever else comes along with the realization of those few goals is gravy. In JK's times the important thing was to resume development, create wealth and jobs, and this was done.

In Guimaraes' view, the country is fully capable of overcoming the present crisis. A president who is elected by more than 40 million votes will have all the legitimacy he needs to get the society moving again. He doesn't think Orestes Quercia will seek the presidential nomination if elections are held this year. He has an excellent relationship with the Sao Paulo governor, whom he has helped on the federal level and whom he plans to see on Ash Wednesday at Bandeirantes Palace. He sees Aureliano Chaves as a politician of great perception, with a keen mind. Therefore, he assumes that Chaves will not be a candidate. It is vital for one who runs for the presidency to have his own state united behind him, or virtually so. That is Aureliano's biggest problem—he doesn't have the support of Governor Newton Cardoso. In Sao Paulo, even with Lula in the race, the PMDB will be united. Leonel Brizola is already a candidate and it will take a lot of work to beat him. He could end up in second place, at which time he might receive the support of Luis Ignacio "Lula" da Silva, also a candidate, in the final round.

Guimaraes finds it very strange that, in most of the states, the creatures are turning against their creators. Alvaro Dias and Jose Richa are in deep trouble. Max

Mauro and Gerson Camata too, in Espirito Santo. Not to mention Orestes Quercia and Franco Montoro in Sao Paulo. And Amazonino Mendes and Gilberto Mestrinho, in Amazonas, aren't in good shape either. There are other cases like these. Dr. Ulysses commented that he thought it was natural that influential leaders would enter the mayoral races in the state capitals. Franco Montoro in Sao Paulo, Leonel Brizola in Rio, and Helio Garcia in Minas would be forces to deal with. Because what you need, in those elections for mayor of a capital city, are names that have great prestige on the national scene. That is why he is pleased to see preparations being made to launch Raphael de Almeida Magalhaes as a candidate for mayor of Rio de Janeiro. The former social security minister will probably be given one of the posts of secretary in the Moreira Franco administration.

Governors provide substantial support to candidates for the presidency, and the PMDB has almost all of them in its corner. Another factor that will be a big help to the party lies is that the grass roots organizations will be getting mobilized in every city because of the municipal elections.

Returning to the theme of what it takes to be a president of Brazil and what he should try to do, the chairman of the National Constituent Assembly did not shrink from certain criticisms of President Sarney—whom he praised highly, however. He said that presidents should make the best possible use of their time. There is no point in giving hundreds of audiences. It's more worthwhile to think about, plan, and carry out major goals, to make state decisions. He recalled his days as a state congressman. On one occasion he was told to go and talk with Adhemar de Barros. He found the governor at the old Campos Eliseos Palace, at 7 pm, in an advanced state of undress—his shirt open to the waist, shoeless and in his undershorts, with his feet propped up on the table. On seeing his visitor he apologized, saying that he had only been able to begin to work on governing a few minutes ago, work he could only do in the evenings. During the day he had to receive dozens of requests for jobs, favors, etc. At night, however, he concentrated on decision-making and serious conversations. That's when he accomplished projects like the Anchieta highway, and the road which would later be given the name of his executioner, Castello Branco; not to mention the Hospital das Clinicas and other projects of undeniable importance. Ulysses does not believe that a president needs to follow that example, much less work in dishabille, but he must use every minute of his time, managing it with almost scientific precision, for high-level governing tasks.

Another characteristic of a good president, in Guimaraes' words, is that he should be in continual contact with the general public. This is achieved by traveling around the country, getting a feel for their problems "in the flesh," and demonstrating that he is working on the solutions. In fact, that is what he had just been doing

when he went to Rio and Petropolis. He felt that despite being terrified by the catastrophe, the people were pleased with his visit. He signed a decree allocating funds to meet the most immediate needs, and ordered Minister Mailson da Nobrega to have the money released immediately. He appointed a working group to help with the reconstruction.

The telephone rang while he was talking with the journalists in the Piantella restaurant. It was President Sarney, calling from Colombia. "My gosh, how did he find me here?" he asked, before taking the phone and conversing rapidly with Sarney. He reported what he had done regarding the floods, inquired how the discussions with the Colombian president were going, and then came back to his analysis of the principal issues of the moment.

It was then that he appeared worried. He emphasized that it would be a disaster if we are unable to promulgate the new Constitution soon. He acknowledged that the people are discouraged and disenchanted with the political elites, but this can be explained. The National Constituent Assembly superimposed itself on the other national institutions precisely because of its duty to blaze new trails. To endow the nation with the fundamental principles that can serve as beacons for the future and enable the president of Brazil to take effective action to break through the present bottlenecks. "Which president, the future one?" someone asked. He answered: "Obviously."

Ulysses went on to say that every effort must be made to promulgate the new Constitution quickly. There is no reason why we cannot set 21 April as the date. His task has been to keep the debates on track, and he will do more. There is no need for more than two speakers on each topic during the transmittal phase: one in favor, and one against. Many worthy requests can be combined, incorporated via co-authorship. The transmittal statements need not last longer than 15 or 20 minutes each, and the electronic voting process should not take more than 15 minutes. He insisted he would schedule Saturday and Sunday sessions and said that he doesn't understand why so many congressmen and senators hate Brasilia. It's been 5 months since he last visited Sao Paulo, and he will have to take advantage of Carnival in order to see his grandchildren. He hopes that the work will be finished by the date after tomorrow and that all the members of the Constituent Assembly will be on hand in Brasilia next Wednesday. But he has been surprised by the high attendance rate so far. At times, when he sees that the attendance has passed the 500 mark, he has asked himself: "My God, why so many?"

Guimaraes did outline some complaints or mild criticisms concerning the draft now being debated. For example, he discovered a serious error as regards the legislative process. Too many things are being left to the law, and there is no differentiation between laws that complement the Constitution, and ordinary legislation.

The former enjoys supremacy and must be protected from presidential vetoes, since it is associated with the power of the Constituent Assembly. This is why the current Constitution requires approval by an absolute majority for passage of complementary laws. Ordinary laws require only a simple majority. Therefore, if the president of the Republic vetoes a complementary law, this does damage to the constitutional principle. An example of this might be tenure in employment, if the decisions are left to legislation. He didn't notice this in time, but perhaps a solution can be found during the second round of voting. He will talk to the reporter, Bernardo Cabral, on the premise that the executive branch cannot intervene in complementary law.

Guimaraes says he is ready with a solution if, during the midst of the presidential campaign, it is found that there is a backlog of complementary and ordinary legislation which the Congress must debate and pass after promulgation of the new Constitution: the leadership of the various parties will meet and select the most necessary ones. Those five or six that are really essential will be voted on as a group. The rest will be dealt with afterwards. Why not during a special session of Congress in December, January, or February, after the elections?

In the opinion of the Sao Paulo congressman, the proposal for a parliamentary system of government will be defeated. It will not pass. The nation does not want that system of government—this is what the members of the Constituent Assembly have learned from their constituents back home. In fact, he has already noticed that the number of congressmen and senators who bring this issue to his attention is getting declining daily. The next few days could see the beginning of decisions on this subject because Article 14 of the draft, concerning nationality and requiring that the prime minister be a native-born Brazilian, is scheduled to be examined. However, a decision on the subject might be postponed until examination of the chapter that specifically deals with the system of government. Any related articles that might already have been voted on could be corrected at that time.

Above all, Ulysses kept harping on the theme of compromise when he referred to the work of the Constituent Assembly. If the PMDB had wanted to, it could have forced approval of its own draft, since it has a parliamentary majority, but then the resulting Constitution would be his party's Constitution, not the nation's.

That is why the parties and their leaders are being supplanted by a larger reality, the National Constituent Assembly. The so-called Centrao became aware of this right away, during the first vote: it had wanted to impose its own solutions but it had to retreat. Mario Covas also kept quiet. It is only when agreements are reached that things work out right even if, on certain principles, a confrontation must take place through the voting process.

When asked who creates the most problems for him, he refused to identify anyone specifically, but the description he gave fits Congressman Roberto Cardoso Alves pretty well. He complained about certain right-wing radicals, and mentioned one congressman's concern about property such as jewelry, paintings, and books, which had not been specifically mentioned in the article on property. He answered that legislator by saying that pretty soon he would be asking for constitutional guarantees for his dentures. When one senator called him the "emperor," he wanted to know whether the reference was to Pedro I or to Pedro II. Because he wouldn't accept comparison with the former, who closed the National Constituent Assembly...

Ulysses Guimaraes did not try to avoid answering questions on pessimistic speculation concerning, for example, the possibility that "black holes" could show up. He said that he would mobilize the "Vale dos Caidos" against them. Then he explained that the metaphor refers to the group which is always on standby, at every convention, parliament, or assembly. These are the congressmen and senators who station themselves on the floor, from the midpoint to the very end of the plenary sessions, complying with all the procedural decisions and who, when faced with prolonged impasses, begin to demand, in loud tones: "Let's vote, let's vote." The "Vale dos Caidos" will take care of the "black holes."

It was already long after midnight when, as he said good night to the reporters whom he had invited to dinner, Ulysses Guimaraes apologized for leaving so early by saying, "Now I have to go to Renato's (Archer) house where Raphael (de Almeida Magalhaes) and some other friends are waiting for me..."

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Extinction of Existing Parties Gaining Favor in Government

33420054a Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO
in Portuguese 22 Jan 88 p 3

[Article by C.C.]

[Text] Brasilia—In the government and the National Constituent Assembly, there is a growing body of opinion in favor of abolishing the existing parties so as to facilitate an ideological and political regrouping of the various forces in conflict. Minister of Health Borges da Silva, who is a PMDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement Party] deputy for Parana and one of the coordinators of the Democratic Center, is among those who are making no secret of the idea.

He feels that the current parties, or at least the largest ones such as the PMDB and the PFL [Liberal Front Party], have completed the cycle of their existence and accomplished their missions. Today they are internally disparate conglomerations made up of heterogeneous

groups in constant conflict with each other over questions of doctrine or for reasons of political interest. It will not be possible to continue like this because the result is instability and a lack of congressional support for the government—both the current one and those to come. In his opinion, it would be better for the party leaders to acknowledge that fact, stop swimming against the tide, and reach an agreement to abolish the parties. He favors that approach over their extinction through legal channels as proposed in an amendment submitted this week by Deputy Adolfo de Oliveira (Liberal Party, State of Rio de Janeiro).

Minister of Interior Joao Alves, who belongs to the PFL, does not go so far as to propose their extinction, but he almost reaches that point. He feels that in view of the way things are, it will be difficult to continue, but he also rejects interference by the law—that is, the State—in matters pertaining to political parties. Every party should reflect and decide for itself after acknowledging the difficulties.

Several ministers prefer not to state their opinions on the matter publicly, since anything they say could be interpreted as interference by the executive branch in the affairs of the legislative branch, but they are nevertheless rooting for an extensive reorganization of the party framework.

Their number includes Antonio Carlos Magalhaes (PFL), minister of communications, and Prisco Viana (PMDB), minister of housing and urban affairs. They admit that in practice, the parties are no longer functioning. The parties have lost their unity and consist of a number of impervious blocs or segments that behave in accordance with their own views and contribute to the demoralization of party life. It is clear that the government also includes ministers in favor of keeping the existing parties, among them Luis Henrique, minister of science and technology; Renato Archer, minister of welfare and social security; and Jader Barbalho, minister of agrarian reform—all members of the PMDB.

The important thing to be noted is that in Congress the trend of opinion in favor of extinction is growing. Fernando Lyra, former minister of justice, is announcing his readiness to leave the PMDB as soon as the new Constitution is promulgated. He notes that his party is worn out and currently divided between the MUP (Progressive Unity Movement), the traditionalists, the Democratic Center, the independent Left, and the "poire" group. In his words, parties exist as long as their members have common objectives, while possibly disagreeing on the means of achieving those objectives. That was how it was with the old MDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement] and, later, with the PMDB. The common denominator was the desire to end the dictatorship and establish a democratic system, and the movement included people with differing ideologies.

With authoritarianism removed, the result could not have been anything except confusion and the loss of unity in action, precisely because the objectives are now different. Some want orthodox capitalism, and others want socialism—the former favoring privatization and the latter favoring nationalization. There is no cure, not even in party loyalty, since that is a solution from the past which has no place in democracy. Loyalty cannot be imposed by law, like a straitjacket. It must be spontaneous and natural. If it does not exist, the solution is an extensive reorganization.

The traditionalists agree, although they waver as to the appropriateness of leaving the PMDB. They would be left at a disadvantage, and for that reason, extinction would be preferable: No one would take the spoils or inherit the established structures. Everything would start over. The Democratic Center thought at first that it could form the embryo of a new party, but it later returned, preferring to fight for control of the PMDB. Now the trend is reversing itself again under the impetus provided by the "Big Center," which has grown larger and more influential and also includes congressmen from other parties—but only for the specific purpose of exercising influence in the National Constituent Assembly.

There is obviously a reaction by the party leaders. Ulysses Guimaraes does not even want to hear about the extinction of the PMDB, which serves as his trademark and, moreover, as the instrument for his personal projects. It is only through the structure and dividends of the party he heads that he will become president of the Republic. Marco Maciel, chairman of the PFL, also rejects the proposal. He points out that the extinction of parties by an act of government has been harmful to the country's political development. In 1930, the revolution did away with the parties existing at the time. Others were established, and they were dissolved in 1937. The already ancient parties established in 1945 continued to purify and assert themselves even ideologically, but found themselves prohibited from functioning in 1965 under the terms of Institutional Act No 2. ARENA [National Renewal Alliance] and the MDB were abolished as a result of Constitutional Amendment No 11 in 1979. If we repeat the mistakes of the past by adopting the Adolfo Oliveira amendment, everything will start all over again. Each party must have enough freedom to decide for itself. The PMDB is displaying obvious ideological confusion, but the PFL is not. There may be division among the Liberals, but it is dictated by factors of a political nature.

Those opinions show that the subject is under debate again. Those behind it, such as Adolfo de Oliveira, do not accept the criticism that the authoritarian past is being repeated. They say that extinction of the parties in 1930, 1937, and 1965 came about through acts of the dictatorial government and that the parties were not allowed to defend themselves or even to take part in the decisionmaking process. This time, if more than 280

members of the Constituent Assembly support his amendment, dissolution will come about by majority vote, democratically and without coercion.

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UDR Growth, Strategy for Municipal Elections Viewed

33420053 Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese
31 Jan 88 p 10

[Text] With 240 regional branches nationwide and over 250,000 members, the Ruralist Democratic Union is preparing to test its strategy for winning municipal elections at the ballot box. In the upcoming elections for mayors and municipal councilors, the Ruralists intend to act decisively. Their chairman, Ronaldo Caiado, advocates the holding of general elections before 1988 is out, but he denies that he will be a candidate for president of the Republic. He says that at the right time, the UDR will choose its candidate and show its strength.

Struggling for general elections this year and playing a conspicuous part in the election campaign in order to elect its representatives at the municipal, state, and federal levels constitute the objective of the Ruralist Democratic Union (UDR), according to its chairman, physician Ronaldo Caiado. That goal, he says, will be achieved thanks to the extensive organization work that the group has been doing throughout the country, where it has now established 240 regional committees and attracted over 250,000 members representing a base of 4.5 million rural producers.

To implement his strategy, Ronaldo Caiado made 215 trips around the country in 1987 and hopes to triple the number this year. Besides presenting his antileftist message and defending private enterprise, he also wants to appeal to the pocketbook of the rural producers themselves. He says: "Today, with rare exceptions, the farmer is living on the verge of bankruptcy."

Another point of support for the Ruralist message is popular dissatisfaction with the traditional politicians and institutions. In Ronaldo Caiado's opinion, most of the parties do not represent the people, and the candidates selected at the various party conventions "are often real farces to whom society demonstrates its repudiation when the time comes."

He emphasizes: "We must take advantage of this moment, in which the life of the country is being completely transformed by the drawing up of a new constitution, to make room for independent candidates emerging from a people's mobilization."

According to him, those candidates would be able to restore the population's confidence. The idea of independent candidates is one of the foundations of the UDR's message in the various Brazilian cities.

He says that the profile of the candidate winning support from his group will be that of someone who possesses "a minimum of intellectual equipment along with unselfishness and popular support and has a program that does not fold in the face of criticism as well as a clear proposal in favor of free enterprise." He declines to comment on how many or which candidates have already committed themselves to the interests of the Ruralists, but affirms the group's intention to elect as many mayors and municipal councilors as possible. He also denies that those candidates will be supported by the group with subsidies taken from the various auctions being held by the UDR. He says: "The law does not allow that kind of assistance."

As far as the deadline for holding elections is concerned, Ronaldo Caiado says that the UDR is ready to go to work no matter what date is decided on by the Constituent Assembly. But he insists that his position is one of "support for holding general elections immediately." After the election campaign, the Ruralists are ready to unfurl another banner: the achievement of a social pact, but without participation by the Left—and Caiado rules out the progressive church, the PT [Workers Party], and the Communist parties from the start.

The chairman of the UDR rejects the possibility of being a candidate himself with the support of the rural producers. He says he is going to work in "support of the candidate most capable of uniting society in the defense of liberalism and genuine democracy."

"I can be a good political middleman, and that is what I will try to be. The UDR has not yet chosen someone to run for president of the Republic, especially because the only candidate actually nominated by his party so far is Lula. The others are candidates to be candidates."

In his opinion, restoring the people's confidence also requires a direct challenge to so-called electoral protests such as the one that occurred recently in Vila Velha (where the number of blank ballots exceeded the total vote for the winning candidate, a member of the PT). Caiado argues that "after the general elections, responsibility for what happens in the country will rest on society itself."

"The UDR is not interested in pursuing the scorched-earth policy that the Left is trying to impose on society. People cannot just show what is wrong: They must provide alternatives. That is the only way for us not to continue fostering despair. Otherwise we will continue to vote for mosquitoes, as happened in Vila Velha."

Turning his batteries on the Left, he ridicules the accusation by the PT in Pernambuco that the UDR is buying weapons with which to arm ranchers as a means of exerting pressure in connection with the municipal elections. He challenges the PT "or any other Communist party" to a public debate where each side will prove where it gets the money for its support.

"The UDR has only one means of collecting money: through the auctions, where the producers donate what they can. We are very well acquainted with the objective of those leftist organizations, which talk so much about foreign capital. They are subsidized: They receive rubles, francs, marks and schillings. They have sold out their integrity, but we have not. We have already proven that the Pastoral Commission on Land and the lawyers for the PT and the CUT [Sole Central Organization of Workers] went to Conceicao do Araguaia in southern Para to protect 12 murderers who slaughtered a director of the UDR," he emphasizes.

Southern Leadership Strengthened Following Siege of Squatters

Porto Alegre—Initially, the 200,000 rural landowners in Rio Grande do Sul resisted the UDR. But the situation changed after July of last year, when the UDR organized an armed 6-day siege of 1,500 tenant farmers who had invaded the Sao Juvenal Ranch in Cruz Alta. Its action united 300 ranchers in support of the owner, Julio Cesar Dias da Costa. That show of force, with pictures in the press of men on horseback tossing invaders over barbed-wire fences, sealed the leadership of the state chairman, plastic surgeon Gilberto Scopel de Moraes, and ensured the organization a place in the South.

The UDR currently has 33 municipal groups divided among 6 regional branches, and 2 more branches are being formed. The nearly 10,000 members include large and small landowners, sympathizers, and students. Methods have changed: Shows of force are no longer necessary, and the organization tries to indicate its importance by other means.

The most active regional branch is in Uruguaiana and has over 2,000 members. It is carrying out an experiment with nine families of small producers in the district of Sao Marcos, all of whom went bankrupt as a result of loans from the Bank of Brazil. The UDR has supplied inputs, provides permanent technical assistance, and wants them not only to pay their debts but to show a profit.

The UDR wants to use the results as an example of the plan which its national chairman, Ronaldo Caiado, presented to the minister of agrarian reform, Jader Barbalho, on the 6th of this month. The UDR wants to establish settlements through the government plan as soon as it receives the approximately 800,000 cruzados allocated by government departments to each family that has been settled.

The state chairman covered more than 30,000 kilometers last year and was accompanied several times by Ronaldo Caiado. Forty years old and with experience as a professor of medicine at the Federal Universities of Rio Grande do Sul and Passo Fundo and the Catholic University of Porto Alegre, Gilberto Scopel has impressed producers with his speeches at meetings. His

determined temperament was demonstrated when, in self-defense, he killed the man who murdered his father during a land dispute while Scopel was still a young man. In 1979, he shot and wounded his former wife's male companion.

The UDR's strong presence on Rio Grande do Sul's frontier with Argentina, an area with large landholdings, is causing conflicts and disagreements. Bishop Augusto Petro, for example, has issued a memo prohibiting any member of the organization from occupying a position of leadership in the municipality's Christian associations.

Bishop Petro no longer grants interviews because he is hoping to make up with the local chairman of the UDR, Jose Antonio Fagundes, 44, who is also known as "Tonico." The bishop says that Fagundes is his friend. But he was quite irritated when "Tonico" brought the national chairman, Ronaldo Caiado, to the city, where the latter accused the church of instigating the invasions and financing the purchase of weapons in Cuba. The bishop then challenged the UDR to prove its accusations. In his opinion, agrarian reform cannot be carried out in Uruguaiana:

"The tenant farmer would starve to death because the soil is only 20 cm deep. Below that there is nothing but gravel."

The chairman of the Union of Rural Workers, Oravandil de Freitas, does not agree. He points out that in Uruguaiana, there exists the curious situation in which there are 500 small producers, most of whom lease their land, but more than 5,000 employees on the large landholdings—"people who have worked for 31 years without knowing that they were entitled to a vacation every 12 months." In February, employers and workers will discuss a collective bargaining agreement to improve the gains already made, such as a wage 12 percent above the minimum and sickness benefits.

Goal in Sao Paulo: Beat the PMDB

Sao Paulo—The UDR's main objective beginning now is to beat the PMDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement Party]—chiefly that party's leftwing segments—in the upcoming municipal elections. In the UDR's opinion, it is they who are responsible for the serious crisis being experienced by the country. That strategy was revealed by the organization's state chairman, Roosevelt Roque dos Santos.

He explains that the UDR is not a political party and cannot even finance election campaigns, but the organization is now calling on its 20,000 members in the state to start working on behalf of candidates who are considered friendly to the organization and who support free enterprise in every segment of the economy.

"We are organizing the UDR's regional branches in Sao Paulo in keeping with the national stance so that they will support those candidates and even pay for their campaigns out of their own pockets. They have all decided to help," says Roque dos Santos.

He points out that the organization does not want to support any party because the UDR is interested in the candidate's philosophy—regardless of the latter's party affiliation. Roque dos Santos says that the UDR does not support parties precisely because it wants to maintain an independence enabling it to make demands and take action on all fronts.

"If we had been connected with any party during the confrontation with the government over the plan for agrarian reform, we would have found it hard to win. Agrarian reform is now a thing of the past, and we were able to show what a big farce it was," he says.

In the opinion of the UDR's chairman in Sao Paulo, the organization's chief opponents are still the progressive church and the parties on the Left.

"The church and the leftists carried on a furious campaign against us, but without success. The priests even threatened the faithful to keep them from having any contact with us. All of that wound up helping us, and now we are a respected organization throughout Brazil because we do serious work."

In Sao Paulo, the UDR has regional branches in the cities of Presidente Prudente, Dracena, Tupa, Ourinhos, Assis, Aracatuba, Barretos, Catanduva, Bauru, Marilia, Garca, Ribeirao Preto, Sao Carlos, Avare, Tatui, Vale do Paraiba, Sao Jose do Rio Preto, Jales and Fernandopolis, as well as in Greater Sao Paulo.

According to Roosevelt, preliminary contacts with possible candidates have been made by practically all the regional branches. He declined to say who they were, but said that all of them would be known and identified with the Ruralists when the election campaign began.

"We are so excited about the public's receptiveness to our work that we intend to amend our bylaws to admit sympathizers who are not rural producers. There are many doctors, students, and lawyers who want to join the organization."

UDP Makes Progress Throughout Northeast

Recife—Strong in Para, where its firm action put an end to accusations that the rural producers were organizing an armed militia prepared to evict rural workers from large rural landholdings, active in Maranhao, where it already has regional branches for directing activities by stockraisers, and still in the process of establishing itself

in the other states in the Northeast, the UDR is preparing to play an eminently political role in the municipal elections scheduled for November, when it hopes to elect candidates in tune with its ideas.

A check of the UDR's numbers in the Northeast indicates that it has about 5,000 members in a little over 10 branches in that region, most of them located in Maranhao and in the capitals of the other states.

In Maranhao, where one of its oldest and most active regional branches is located—currently with 1,800 members—the UDR is now concerned with expanding its branches. In Ceara, where it began as the Association of Rural Producers (APRUCE) and did not adopt the name of the UDR until this week, it now has 1,000 members. In Pernambuco, where it arrived only last November with support from the state's sugarcane suppliers, its membership is also reaching 1,000 this weekend as it sponsors an auction.

Oddly, what characterizes the UDR in the Northeast is the fact that it has no connection with the traditional political leaders in those states. Refusing to be associated with it are the sugarmill owners in Pernambuco, Alagoas, Paraiba and Rio Grande do Norte, the local political bosses in Ceara, and most chairmen of the region's agricultural federations.

11798

Causes Underlying Growing Support for Direct Elections Viewed

33420054b Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO
in Portuguese 3 Feb 88 p 3

[Article by C.C.]

[Text] Brasilia—In that veritable seesaw which the National Constituent Assembly has become, there has just been another swing: If the length of President Jose Sarney's term were voted on today, those in favor of a 4-year term would win. Of the 317 members who signed the Matheus Iensen amendment establishing a 5-year term, only 150 say they are prepared to vote for a 5-year term. Of the rest, 50 admit that they have changed their minds, and the others are sitting on the fence: "maybe," "who knows?" and "perhaps."

The poll, which was taken by leader Carlos Sant'Anna, is giving rise to doubt, although he cannot admit it publicly. Since there is still no deadline for deciding the issue, no one is getting exasperated on either side. Everyone is relying on the time factor and keeping an eye on the combination of circumstances, since that is what will determine when the Constituent Assembly decides on a term of 4 or 5 years—in May, June, or July. Incidentally, things have been the same since last year: First the seesaw favors President Jose Sarney and leans toward ending his term of office in March 1990, then it swings back to March 1989. It is because of that uncertainty that

he has abandoned his efforts to foresee how the vote will go and chosen to begin immediately what will be the final phase of his administration—one of vigorous efforts to combat the public deficit and corruption—although without knowing whether that phase will last 1 or 2 years.

As will be seen below, the problem is that there are combinations of circumstances, and then there are combinations of circumstances. That very physiological process may lead to the worst. It helps to start at the beginning: It has been proven by a thousand public opinion polls that the country wants to vote. The various classes of the population agree on their desire, so often demonstrated and frustrated, to choose their president of the Republic and to do so within the presidential system. Brazilians have not elected their presidents since 1960. That may be a delusion, and it unquestionably is, since no miraculous being capable of solving all the economic, social, political or administrative problems is going to emerge from the ballot box. Nevertheless, that is what the nation wants, and anyone who goes against it is making a mistake. Businessmen, military, workers, the church, universities and farmers—in short, all—are making it clear that they want presidential elections as soon as possible. This is not an affront to Sarney or an injustice being perpetrated on him or his ministers. The phenomenon seems to go far beyond that. It is the equivalent of an escape valve: the spout on a tea kettle or the air vent on a pressure cooker. And it is not the only thing to be considered.

The tumult and confusion in the work of the Constituent Assembly, added to the poor performance of almost all the governors elected last year, are pointing to the bigger and broader solution—general elections—and that is also clearly expressed in the polls. That solution would even leave Sarney in a better position. If the country is being cleaned up and new institutions are being set up, why not go further and hold broad, general, and unrestricted elections for all elective posts—from deputy and senator to mayor, municipal councilor, state deputy, and president of the Republic?

Doing so would mean taking an eraser to everything and everybody before the political page becomes one big smudge. Everything could begin from scratch, with those elected being given the mechanisms for implementing the new Constitution and pursuing, with greater legitimacy and representativeness, a complete revision of ordinary legislation. It would be a kind of democratic revolution that would be brought to completion “from back to front”—with the initial act being carried out last—but still capable of functioning.

Does that idea have any chance of being carried out? Don't even imagine it. There is no chance that deputies and senators are coolly going to vote for the extinction of their own mandates. They are agreeable to handing over the head of the president of the Republic, but they are not going to touch the governors, because ending the

mandates of the latter would provide an unanswerable argument for ending their own. After all, they were all elected on the same date in November 1986. So the most that is going to happen in the National Constituent Assembly will be a decision to set a 4-year term for President Sarney—unless, of course, the seesaw shifts back again. But what if things heat up? It may happen in the heat of the moment, and that makes it worthwhile for us to consider what that elevation in temperature would mean.

It is not out of the question that the already deep crisis will grow worse. A more than dangerous picture is presented by the shadow of hyperinflation, the foreign debt, the succession of political and wage strikes, the ineffectiveness of administrative machinery in public services, the government's lack of control, the bankruptcy of certain institutions, corruption, the permissiveness that is spreading through society, and the inability of the National Constituent Assembly to get anywhere after a year of work. Taken individually, those problems have solutions. But when they are all put together, there is no way to prevent them at a certain moment from producing that sudden mixture causing chaos, convulsion, and paralyzation in the country.

Many years ago, when he was director of the Traffic Department in the city of Rio de Janeiro, Col Americo Fontenelle struggled every day with monumental traffic jams—in Copacabana, downtown, or in Tijuca and the suburbs. He did what he could, but he would warn: “Someday there will be gridlock. From Cascadura to Leblon, nothing will move. All it will take is certain episodes which, instead of happening in isolation, will all occur at the same time in different neighborhoods.”

And that is exactly what happened. A storm, two or three collisions, and a chase after some holdup men all occurred in different locations, and Rio de Janeiro became a hell. Nobody was moving in any direction, and to solve the problem, the authorities went on the radio and advised motorists to abandon their vehicles right where they were—in squares or on streets or sidewalks—and walk home. It was 2 days later before the situation returned to normal.

That is the situation now. There may be gridlock someday. And if there is, general elections will come “in the heat of the moment,” with trauma and who knows what impulse behind them or by the hand of some adventurer. It would be much better to hold those elections “coolly” under a great national accord while there is still time.

11798

First Joint Venture With Soviet Capital Formed
33420054c Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese
22 Jan 88 p 20

[Text] Sao Paulo—With an initial capital investment of \$400,000, the USSR is joining with two Brazilian firms—Teachers and the Cacique Instant Coffee Company—to establish Prodimex of Brazil, which initially

will import Soviet vodka in bulk for all of Latin America. The firm hopes to win at least 4 percent of the Brazilian market, which is estimated to total at least 2 million 12-liter cases per year, the equivalent of \$120 million (9.6 billion cruzados). This is the first joint venture in Latin America to include Soviet capital.

The above information was provided to O GLOBO by the managing deputy chairman of the Cacique Company, Sergio Coimbra, who added that the controlling interest in the joint venture will be held by the Soviet state-owned enterprise Sojuzpodoimport (65 percent), with the remaining 35 percent divided between Cacique (20 percent) and Teachers (15 percent). The partnership agreement will be signed next month.

Coimbra explained: "With its headquarters in Brazil and a Soviet as its chairman, Prodimex will import vodka in bulk from the USSR. The vodka will be bottled by Teachers and distributed throughout Latin America."

The businessman also announced that besides marketing vodka, the firm would also act as middleman in all deals between Brazil and the USSR, and he mentioned as an example the \$10-million contract for exporting instant coffee that was recently signed between Cacique and that country.

With this joint venture, the USSR is hoping to bring the trade balance between the two countries, which is currently favorable to Brazil, into equilibrium. That could be done, for example, through the sale of rural irrigation technology or the exchange of Soviet products for Brazilian manufactured goods.

"The Soviet Union has one of the most highly developed technologies when it comes to rural irrigation. That deal will have to be made with the state-owned Gosaprogram, which is responsible for the USSR's powerful agroindustrial complex and employs over 40 million workers.

11798

Visit by Cuban Foreign Minister Analyzed
33420051a Sao Paulo VEJA in Portuguese
27 Jan 88 p 42

[Text] Unobtrusive, favoring one leg slightly and always enveloped in a cloud of cigar smoke, Isidoro Malmierca, the Cuban foreign minister, arrived in Brazil last week with an invitation and a recommendation in his luggage. During this first visit paid us by a Cuban foreign minister since diplomatic relations were reestablished in June of 1986, Malmierca delivered to President Jose Sarney, during their interview at the Planalto Palace, an invitation from President Fidel Castro to visit Cuba, which was immediately reciprocated. Despite Castro's promise of a future visit to Brazil, Malmierca at no time indicated any special urgency about determining the specifics. In this way, the minister was adhering strictly to the advice given by Fidel Castro to Jorge Bolanos, the

first Cuban ambassador appointed to Brazil since diplomatic relations were broken off in 1964. "Conduct yourself like a nun," the Cuban president instructed.

Malmierca's circumspection was evident at the dinner given at the Itamaraty Palace on Tuesday. Following the copious praise heaped on Fidel Castro by our foreign minister, Abreu Sodre, Malmierca spoke extemporaneously, without reference to any controversial subject. In conclusion, the smooth tone of the discussion could be judged from the comment made by the apostolic nuncio, Dom Carlo Furno. "Many of our priests are more radical than he is," he asserted. The good humor of the foreign minister was even proof against the blatant blunder committed by the pianist at the Itamaraty Palace, when he chose to play the happy notes of "When I Left Cuba," the anthem of the Cuban exiles in Miami.

Even with all of the atmosphere of goodwill which has developed in the relations between Brazil and Cuba, Malmierca was unable to get even a cultural cooperation agreement signed and delivered to President Fidel Castro. "The version submitted to me was neither in Spanish nor in Portuguese," the foreign minister said. Linguistic questions apart, there were stumbling blocks in the functional process of the cultural cooperation agreement as well. The Itamaraty Palace proposed that Brazilian students be sent to enroll in postgraduate courses, while the Cubans wanted to include undergraduate courses in the exchange as well. The discussions got nowhere.

Brazil, in truth, does not want to sign anything. The last time Brazilians went to Cuba to study was to learn guerrilla and terrorist techniques. On the other hand, many of the 100 Brazilians who took the terrorist courses in Cuba ended up being killed, as members of the Operation Bandeirantes (OBAN) detachments established in 1969 by Abreu Sodre, who was at that time governor of Sao Paulo. Malmierca's visit shows that it serves no good purpose to keep referring back to the past. Cuba has considered its Brazilian venture a closed issue for a long time, and Sodre prefers to forget what happened to the former students of terrorism. Even so, the past had not been definitively forgotten—none of the military ministers appeared at the dinner given for Malmierca at the Itamaraty Palace. This was the reverse of what happened on the occasion of the visit paid us by Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze last September.

Malmierca's visit thus provided a concrete demonstration that, except for the absence of the military ministers, Brazil and Cuba have succeeded in maintaining and developing civilized relations. It has been Fidel Castro's desire to visit Brazil within the context of a long-term strategy. If he can break out of Cuba's isolation in Latin America, this will strengthen his position for a rapprochement with the United States, his main goal. To this end, he is taking great pains with gestures of courtesy and goodwill toward Brazil, to the extent of making an

exception to the rule established after the USSR planted a monstrosity resembling an Aztec rocket—the elephantine Soviet embassy building—in the very heart of Havana. Having decided to be flexible, the Cuban government provided the land for a Brazilian embassy and suggested that Oscar Niemeyer design the building, which cost more than \$30,000. However, the project was suspended by the Itamaraty Palace, which claimed that the total cost of \$3.5 million was too high.

The final outcome of the invitation issued to Castro depends on Sarney. If he says that he wants to go to Cuba first, everything will come to a halt. If, on the contrary, he proposes a date, he will make it possible for Castro to pay his first visit to South America since November of 1971, when he visited President Salvador Allende in Chile and spent a good part of his time with a general

named Augusto Pinochet, who was then unknown. The preparatory steps for a visit have already been taken. However, the rule to the effect that when it is said that someone is coming, he does not, while when no visit is expected it does come about in the end, continues to prevail. Exactly 2 weeks ago, the press reported that plans had been made for Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to visit Brazil, Uruguay and other countries in Latin America. This report was based on information obtained from the Uruguayan foreign minister, Enrique Iglesias, himself. But the Soviet embassies in Montevideo and Brazil, and the Itamaraty Palace as well, hastened to deny the report. Today it has been learned that plans have been made for such a visit in October.

5157

Worker Concerns, Political Views Surveyed
33480067a Santiago HOY in Spanish
25-31 Jan 88 pp 21-22

[Article by Cetra/CEAL: "Workers: Pay, Primary Concern"]

[Text] There is every indication that this summer's first harvest will be figures, percentages, statistical charts, and arguments among experts. Reason: the polls have ripened abundantly, and could compete with the season's products: Paine watermelons, and musical festivals.

A study made by Southern Professionals and Cetra/CEAL (Center for Labor Studies and Consultation), with backing from Diagnos, has nevertheless proven to be innovative: Instead of probing preferences with a "yes" or "no," it asked a group of workers which problems concerned them most, and attempted to gauge their perceptions and attitudes. Also new is the fact that the sample includes various segments of workers, based on their activity.

The results, which are detailed below, are revealing. The priority for wage-earners today is the level of their pay. Generally, they agree with the traditional types of struggle for their rights and demands, but they do not approve of the takeover of factories and work sites. Job stability is deeply disturbing to the educational sector. All share the desire for unity, although it does not necessarily entail the establishment of a single federation. And in politics, they continue to show a preference for center and left of center options.

Eduardo Echeverria, Raul Iriarte, Javier Martinez, Carlos Vergara, and Mario Alburquerque participated in the Cetra/CEAL and Southern team.

One of the most prominent features in the opinion of wage-earning workers is the relative importance that they attribute to the wage level, among their most pressing ambitions.

A total of 50.7 percent of those polled ranked this issue as a priority in comparison with other problems, such as job stability or labor laws. This coincides with the concern that has been expressed in various sectors (including business owners) regarding the low level that salaries have maintained, despite the recovery in the situation of the business firms. It is also a major indicator for trade union leaders.

Also prominent is the view that those interviewed have of the relations between workers and business owners.

The majority were in agreement that "good understanding between business owners and workers is mutually beneficial" (86.9 percent agree, as opposed to 9.3 percent who disagree); but they also believe that "the interests of workers and business owners are opposed" (58.3 percent agree, versus 15.2 percent who disagree).

Hence, the view of wage-earners appears to be marked by a good disposition toward understanding between the two sides, based on recognition of the differences in interest separating them.

As for the ownership of business firms, there are different opinions, depending on the nature of each one of them.

Whereas, in the case of public services and basic resources, a wide majority prefer state ownership, the same thing does not hold true for the banks, wherein there is a majority option for private ownership. In the case of large companies, state ownership is chosen more frequently, although without attaining an absolute majority. Stress should be placed on the low percentage attained, in general, by the option of workers' ownership. It may be inferred that the plans for privatization of industries made by the state do not have any great support among the workers, but, at the same time, that private ownership is legitimized considerably in other areas.

Trade Union Aspect

With regard to trade union activity, the question was asked about the support gained by various types of action for struggle and pressure common in the labor movement.

Majority support was expressed for nearly all the methods that have been used traditionally to make the workers' demands visible. Only the takeover of work sites is more rejected than approved.

The support for trade union activity is not merely generic. It is also expressed in a knowledge of the national structures that the labor movement has built during recent years. The National Workers Command [CNT] evokes the greatest backing; something that is intensified if one considers the fact that CNS [National Trade Union Coordinating Board], MSU [United Trade Union Movement], and FUT [United Workers Front] are also part of CNT. Note should also be taken of the meager support received in Santiago by the two pro-government federations (Frenao and Solidarity).

This is also confirmed by the level of familiarity that exists with the trade union leaders: Although there is a rather widespread unfamiliarity, Manuel Bustos (39.8 percent) and Rodolfo Seguel (35.9 percent) attain sizable percentages.

The issue of trade union unity also assumes considerable significance, particularly because of the debate going on between the CNT's plank and that of the Democratic Workers Federation (CDT), on this point. Whereas the former upholds the notion of a unified and ideologically pluralistic federation, the latter supports the proposal for ideological federations.

(1) ¿En manos de quién debiera estar la propiedad en cada una de los siguientes tipos de empresas?

	(2) PREDOMINANTEMENTE ESTATAL	PREDOMINANTEMENTE (3) PRIVADA	PREDOMINANTEMENTE (4) DE LOS TRABAJ.	NO SABE (5)	(6) NO RESPONDE
RIQUEZAS BASICAS (cobre, petróleo, carbón, etc.) (7)	67.1	6.6	19.0	5.2	2.1
SERVICIOS PUBLICOS (Chilecta, teléfonos, FF.CC. etc.) (8)	67.0	11.8	14.0	5.3	1.9
GRANDES EMPRESAS INDUSTRIALES (Copec, Papelera, Cemento Melón) (9)	41.9	30.3	16.6	8.8	2.4
LOS BANCOS (10)	27.8	51.0	7.2	10.1	3.9

¿En qué medida aprueba Ud. las siguientes formas de acción de los trabajadores?

	(11) (12) APRUEBA COMPLETAMENTE	(13) APRUEBA	(14) DESAPRUEBA	(15) DESAPRUEBA COMPLETAMENTE	(5) NO SABE	(6) NO RESPONDE
DECLARACIONES PUBLICAS (16)	38.3	49.0	4.9	1.3	4.2	2.4
MANIFESTACIONES EN LAS CALLES (17)	18.5	36.2	30.3	5.4	5.8	3.7
HUELGAS (18)	22.2	39.8	22.9	5.6	5.2	4.3
PARO NACIONAL (19)	19.3	34.0	27.1	8.1	5.4	6.0
Ocupacion de LUGARES DE TRABAJO (20)	13.3	21.5	38.7	11.0	9.0	6.5

Key: 1. Who should control the ownership in each of the following types of enterprises? 2. Predominantly state. 3. Predominantly private. 4. Predominantly workers. 5. Don't know. 6. No answer. 7. Basic resources (copper, oil, coal, etc.) 8. Public services (Chilean Electric Co, Inc, telephones, railroads, etc.) 9. Large industrial enterprises (Chilean Oil Company, Paper Company, Melon Cement) 10. The banks 11. To what extent do you approve of the following types of workers' action? 12. Approve completely. 13. Approve. 14. Disapprove. 15. Disapprove completely. 16. Public statements 17. Street demonstrations 18. Strikes 19. National lockout 20. Takeover of work places

Although a wide majority (63.7 percent agree, and 10.9 percent disagree) believe that "there should be a single national trade union federation," the idea that "unity among the workers is possible, even though two or more trade union federations may exist" is also that of the majority (51.4 percent agree, while 16.0 percent disagree).

The study also inquired about more contingent matters, such as the position toward the plebiscite and electoral registration. The majority think that the holding of the plebiscite is most likely (75 percent), but most of those polled would prefer elections with several candidates (66.6 percent, compared with 15.2 percent who prefer the plebiscite).

A total of 48.4 percent claim to have already enrolled in the Electoral Registers, and 73.3 percent of those not enrolled intend to do so.

Finally, concerning the country's political future, the workers were asked about the type of government that would be most appropriate for Chile.

The predominant trend appears to favor center and left of center options (between Frei and Allende); while the prospect of the continuity of a regime such as the present one (Pinochet) receives only 5.2 percent support among Santiago wage-earners.

For a Sample: 864 Cases

The Diagnos company was responsible for the poll in its phases of sample selection, the implementation thereof, and the coding.

Defined as universe for this study were all the wage-earning workers in Greater Santiago, whether or not they were unionized, and without age limits.

Taken as representative of this universe was a sample of 900 cases, with 864 queries actually made. The latter took place in business firms and services of the following sectors: textile, food, footwear, metal-working, white goods, electricity, and chemical industries; financial, educational, public administration, and municipal sectors; PEM [Minimum Employment Plan], POJH [Employment for Heads of Households Program], and PIMO [expansion unknown]; basic services and health.

		A government like:	
National Workers Command (CNT):	41.0	Jorge Alessandri:	7.8%
Frenao:	1.3	Eduardo Frei:	20.5
Democratic Workers Federation (CDT):	2.2	Salvador Allende:	9.8
United Trade Union Movement (MSU):	1.4	Augusto Pinochet:	5.2
Solidarity Trade Union Federation:	1.5	Between that of Alessandri and Frei:	9.3
United Workers Front (FUT):	0.6	Between that of Frei and Alessandri:	14.6
National Trade Union Coordinating Board (CNS):	4.3	Nicaraguan type:	0.5
None:	24.9	Another:	5.6
Don't know:	19.1	None:	4.7
No answer:	4.5	Don't know:	15.7
Total:	100.0	No answer:	6.4
		Total:	99.8%

2909

Housing Construction in Poblaciones Analyzed
33480067b Santiago HOY in Spanish
18-24 Jan 88 pp 16-18

[Article by John Mueller: "One House, One Vote..."]

[Text] A total of 25.6 percent of the persons polled by Gallup think that the provision of housing was one of the two most important events that occurred in Chile during 1987.

The figure is not insignificant if one considers the fact that some polls taken by opposition agencies are beginning to discover the same trend.

The dilemma is whether this perception is due to an actual creation of new housing, or to the propaganda campaign promoted by the Ministry of Housing in 1987. According to Minister Miguel Angel Poduje (39), whose agenda last year was monopolized by inaugurations, "This is the regime that has constructed the most in the history of Chile." And he provided a statistic: between 1974 and 1986, 750,000 dwellings were built.

The campaign also has a brief, penetrating slogan: "one house every 8 minutes"; in other words, an annual average of 65,700 dwellings. According to the data supplied by the Central Bank, as of September 1987 only 35,831 houses had been built, at a rate which was rising above 10 minutes, and which expanded as the year's end approached.

According to Juan Hamilton, former housing minister in President Eduardo Frei's government, "The government is relying on the housing effort that has been carried out in recent years, through the statistical manipulation being done by the Housing Ministry, and on the great communication power that it has."

Hamilton claims that, in this way, there is a desire to create the impression that "the government has done great work."

In his capacity as a former minister holding that portfolio, Hamilton has led a heated argument with Minister Poduje and his advisors. As a result of it, disputes of all types have emerged, concerning the performance of all previous governments in this area.

Controversial Figures

Since the Housing Ministry was created in 1966, with its first minister, Modesto Collados (later succeeded by Hamilton), the annual construction record occurred in 1971, during the government of Salvador Allende. That year, 89,203 building permits were granted.

In an interview given to EL MERCURIO, Minister Poduje described the claim of 89,000 houses built as a "great fraud by the Allende government," because "that was the number of building permits." He argued that, in 1980, construction started in 1971 was still being completed.

As was confirmed for HOY, the Central Bank keeps statistics only on building permits. The data come directly from the National Institute of Statistics (INE). According to its data bank, between 1974 and September 1987, 489,175 buildings were authorized: an annual average of 34,941 dwellings; based on the calculations of the CIEPLAN [Economic Research Corporation for Latin America] economist, Jose Pablo Arellano, "one house every 15 minutes."

Nevertheless, former Minister Hamilton thinks that, although the lower number of houses built could be specified, "one could also say much about the quality of these dwellings."

Since 1983, the Housing Ministry has considered dwellings measuring 28 square meters in its statistics. Previously, this was not done with houses measuring under 36 square meters.

Hugo Flores, leader of the poblacion movement called "Solidarity," expressed the view that, "The government has constructed places where people don't want to live, with the famous 'sanitary huts.'" In a quick account given to HOY, he cited the case of the El Fundador poblacion, in La Pintana, where housing measuring 28 square meters, without interior divisions, was built.

Similar instances have been repeated in certain emergency poblaciones in Renca, such as Huamachuco II; or, in the Independencia section, the El Cortijo II poblacion.

As a result, the constructed area has declined considerably. During Jorge Alessandri's term, an average of 260 square meters was constructed for every 1,000 inhabitants; the number rose to 271 with Eduardo Frei, reaching 294 with Allende, and has dropped to 198 square meters under the present government.

According to a report by the economist, Jose Pablo Arellano, between 1974 and 1987, housing was built for less than 60 percent of the families. Based on his data, one family is established every 6.5 minutes in Chile.

Thus, Hamilton claims, the housing shortage "has increased seriously." In 1985, a report by Joan MacDonald, considered to be very reliable, numbered the Chilean housing shortage at 748,776 dwellings lacking, with a deficit of 368,219 dwellings. The latter figure relates to those houses which became unusable owing to the earthquake in March of that year, or which were in poor condition.

A year earlier, at the end of 1983 and during the entire first half of 1984, an incident filled with dramatic quality opened the eyes of Chileans regarding the housing issue: the case of the "relatives." Two major "land seizures" occurring in 1983 gave rise to the Cardinal Fresno and Cardinal Silva Henriquez camps.

Mortgage Debtors

At that time, the government did not hesitate to resort to an extreme expedient: about 100 families were evicted, and moved to a southern and northern direction. Many of them returned to Santiago.

Hugo Flores claims: "The problem is that now the government considers those living in the backyard of a house as 'relatives,' and those living under the same roof are not considered such, as they were before. Hence, the promiscuity has become intolerable."

Another problem is that of the mortgage debtors. Hamilton declares: "In fact, this government's policy has meant that a high percentage of heads of households

have been left unemployed, and that those who have kept or procured a job have not benefited from wage readjustment. These changes have prompted over 600,000 families 'with a house' not [words missing from text]. (Fedhach) [Chilean Housing Federation] has described the situation, by way of a parody, as "Chile: one auction every 6.5 minutes."

In 1977, the housing minister at the time, Edmundo Ruiz, admitted that 1.1 million houses had to be built within a 10-year period to end the housing shortage. In 1983, his successor, Modesto Collados, estimated the shortage at 750,000 houses.

The rate of construction has not been on a par with the announcements. Whereas, between 1950 and 1973, the national investment allocated for housing was 6 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), between 1974 and 1982, it totaled only 3 percent, according to former Minister Hamilton's statistics.

He claims: "The statistical license, the lack of a land policy, and the government's waiver of control over construction have caused the current housing to fall considerably short of that in previous periods."

"Operation Site"

Officials of the regime have attempted to discredit Hamilton and his criticism, referring to the housing policy pursued by the Christian Democratic government. Charles Holmes, consultant to the Ministry of Housing, claimed that "The failed 'Operation Site' doomed 117,000 families to the tragedy of cesspools and to living in shanty-town hovels for over 15 years."

Hugo Flores, who lives in the poblacion of Santiago (result of a primitive "Operation Site"), recalls that, "It was the regime that indebted the people who joined this plan, because in 1973 they burned the Housing Ministry's records. Then, to put the ownership titles in order, those affected were required to show payment receipts. Many could not show them and, through a 1976 decree, no previous payment was acknowledged."

Among others, Flores recalls that, with the controversial "Operation Site," the poblaciones of Colon Oriente, Villa Conchali, Cisterna 1 and 2, Santa Olga, Santa Julia, Alborada, Villa Francia, and Clara Estrella were constructed.

Flores adds: "Besides, there was building through self-construction, with the technical assistance and materials contributed by the state. Now, a gentleman from the ministry says that self-construction produces unemployment. What more can there be than exists now? Also, at that time, the person who worked on a Saturday building his house had his work checked, and was paid for it, deducting part of the price of the land."

Hamilton thinks that the government has given up the idea of self-construction to alleviate the shortage, "because there is no confidence in the pobladores, and it has chosen to leave everything to the market's judgment."

Minister Poduje himself admits that there is still a shortage of from 470,000 to 500,000 dwellings. The solution proposed by the government through housing subsidies does not seem to be a solution for increasing

construction either, because, although the minister thinks that, "behind every subsidy, there is unquestionably a house," it is not necessarily a new dwelling.

The obstinate statistics continue to belie the 750,000 houses that the minister ascribes to the government's action. But the "8-minute" arguments are still there, comprising, according to the minister, an "arithmetical advertising scheme" which has permeated 25.6 percent of the individuals polled by Gallup.

2909

End of Government-Opposition Structure Studied
33480073b Bogota EL TIEMPO in Spanish
24 Jan 88 p 4-A

[Article by D'Artagnan: "Destroying the Structure—What Is the Solution?"]

[Text] Everything would seem to indicate that we are moving toward the end of the government-opposition structure. Such unfortunate circumstances as the kidnapping of Andres Pastrana and the very situation in public order itself, which has been seriously disturbed in regions such as Arauca and Caqueta and in capital cities such as Bogota and Medellin, are tending to lead the traditional parties toward a new joint advance, toward a united struggle in defense of our democracy, for that is what, in the final analysis, has been injured—and this is not merely a superficial injury, either—by the recent attacks and the blows struck against its institutions and spokesmen.

In fact, not a few influential sectors of opinion, both liberal and conservative, have deemed the need to consolidate this national unity an urgent one. How? Obviously, by starting with the premise that the conservative party should cease to be and to act as the opposition, assuming instead the responsibilities of government. If not as was done in the era of the National Front, then as was done during subsequent administrations, based on "clearing the ground." In other words, as was done during the governments of Turbay and Betancur. And the argument is seemingly a respectable and powerful one. The existing structure is the ideal one for any active democracy, but it definitely cannot be the formula for the salvation of Colombia in an era of complete institutional abnormality. Therefore, our liberals and our conservatives must join together again, in order not to detract from this healthy bipartisan action which on other occasions has worked so well, allowing us to emerge successful from other equally confusing crises, such as that in 1957.

However, it becomes very clear that the current atmosphere of intimidation and violence has not exactly favored the famous structure. Rather it is rooted in other factors which it would be difficult to overcome, simply because of the fact that we liberals and conservatives together presumably represent the great majorities, capable of greater success in crushing the sorties and challenges from the minorities. In my judgment, the structure has failed to function, but for other reasons. First of all, because all of those who conceived it intellectually were certainly not those best suited to developing it, while others, perhaps, were. The structure as it has been interpreted in practice by colorless ministers is one thing, and what could have been done by a superb cabinet made up of people truly representative of the various factions in the party would have been quite different. We refer to people like Galan, Samper, Duran, Julio Cesar Sanchez, Lemos and Rodolfo Gonzalez. The

best of the liberals must be chosen, just as countries choose their soccer teams when they are preparing to compete for a world championship. They bring out the stars, not the substitutes.

Thus before destroying the structure in the incorrect belief that we will in this way be better able to deal with the thrusts of the subversives, it is necessary first to establish another structure, as former minister Edmundo Lopez Gomez requested in his letter of resignation. This involves the relations between the president and his ministers, which, as far as is known, are almost nonexistent, except with two or three, whose names there is no need to mention. The country would achieve nothing good if what was involved was the replacement of four members of the cabinet with four conservative friends—modifying a whole philosophy—just to keep everyone content. No. The turnabout must take place above all in the executive branch, showing us that there is in fact a coordinated and harmonious team, eliminating, into the bargain, our sad and humiliating impression that when councils of ministers are summoned to meet in the late hours of the night, just a few usually respond. And it is the same ones always, while the others seem to be subordinate to other leaders commanding in the Palace, and not the chief of state directly. He, in the final analysis, is the only one who should command.

Destroying the government-opposition structure, to replace it inevitably with the coalition-position system, is not the sage solution we all sought so desperately. Not only because the liberal movement would be left without any opportunity to demonstrate by deeds why it is the government solution, but because the conservative movement would lose what it has—the opportunity to be the opposition, not to obstruct, but as an alternative, as occurs in other democracies. Very well. It has already been said that our democracy is experiencing very difficult moments, and what is wanted is for all of us who are its defenders to come forth to protect it, setting aside political distinctions. But what is clear and obvious is that if this happens, the only alternative left for those who want to disagree with the government is to join the Patriotic Union and strengthen it, or to join the guerrilla forces directly, given the lack of other opportunities, unless there is a change.

Instead of another appeal to the strategy of the National Front at its stellar moment, what the public demands is a strong state, so that it will not collapse. Turning back the clock of history may be a temporary palliative, but it is not a remedy. And at worst, it could lead later, although not too much later, to thoughts of another type of "turnabout," the kind that generally leads the citizens to desperation, when they find no more doors open.

Supporting the president, reexamining the efficiency of his style and the limited extent to which some of his closest collaborators are representative—this might be a consoling path to pursue, rather than breaking with a political scheme about which it can be said that if it did

not prove useful, the blame lay with the musicians and not with the score. The brief sonnet of the National Front now belongs to history, despite all of the events occurring today. What is happening is very serious, but should not mean a return to a regressive and outworn therapy.

Establishing agreements on the major national issues, proposed at one time by former president Pastrana, would be something else. Without cogovernment or sharing. And it is never too late to undertake concrete discussion to this end.

5157

Political Crisis, Lack of Leadership Decried
33480073c Bogota *EL TIEMPO* in Spanish
26 Jan 88 p 4-A

[Article by Francisco Santos C.: "Where Are We Headed?"]

[Text] "What are we going to do with this country? To what tragedy will we awaken tomorrow?" A newspaper editor asked me these questions. This is a feeling which we all share, while the perplexity of the good citizens has reached the point of panic and total impotence.

The questions being asked in this editorial office yesterday were the same. Now what? Who will be next? What is the government going to do? Everyone's fear is that there is no answer to this Mafia outrage which, combined with the terrorist escalation by the guerrilla fighters, has brought the country to its knees.

Meanwhile, the bureaucracy, the politicians, embroiled in internal struggles for positions, are making no contribution to slowing the dissolution of the institutions they swore to defend. For of the generation of politicians who, when faced with a threat less serious than the present one, decided to forget their rancor and harsh ideological conflicts to create a common front against violence, only the memory remains.

This lack of the leadership which in earlier eras shone like the star of Bethlehem does nothing but cause more fear and uncertainty. This is the case now because there is no one to whom to turn. The likes of Lleras Restrepo and Camargo, of Gomez and Ospina, among others, who with a speech carried on television or radio could calm the minds and hearts of Colombians, are absent from the scene today.

And we, the poor Colombians who only want to work and offer our children a better future, have to content ourselves with political party leadership which supports those who traffic in land, a presidency which is isolated from the national reality, a manic and

thoughtless opposition which has never been able to function as an alternative, and another opposition which, playing both sides, has one foot in legitimacy and the other outside it.

The most serious aspect of this muddled situation is the possible outcome, the way in which all of this chaos may end. Because the impotence and collapse of a juridical and social structure only benefits the extremists who want to subvert the state of law and create the subjective conditions for a radical solution. This dubious flailing weapon of the drug traffickers and the guerrilla fighters, who despite their different ideologies seemingly have the same political program, have plunged the nation into an endless tunnel wherein the light of hope is slowly dimming. It flickered somewhat brighter with the release of Andres Pastrana, but it is still at the point which Carlos Mauro Hoyos defined a few days ago in an interview in a daily newspaper as "on the point of winking out, and that's the end."

Unfortunately, his vile assassination put the "winking out" in the past, forcing Colombians to await the moment when the violent ones will force us out, living or dead, sunk in despair at having to fight against a movement much more powerful than our own forces.

It is clear that the emergence of the conservative candidate for the mayoral post in Bogota momentarily freed our souls from the skepticism and prostration which descended upon us in the morning, when we learned of the kidnapping of the prosecutor. But seen in perspective, this is a ray of light in the dark tunnel of the national reality which somewhat renews a faith, more subjective than cerebral, in our country, our democracy and our institutions.

We should rally around them as never before and take advantage of the electoral process, the popular election of mayors, to give them fervent support. This is because a massive vote for the most suitable candidates, without party distinction, in order to purify politics at its most important base level—the municipality—can be the beginning of a renewal of leadership which will finally rescue this poor nation from the serious state in which it finds itself. In addition to dealing a blow to those who, by means of violence, want to put an end to suffrage, the press and individual freedom.

Finally, in this blend of emotion and sadness, of faith and despair, of lament and joy caused by a release and a crime, there is only further confusion for this silent people who, when they retire for the night to rest, will still not know where we are headed.

5157

Gravity of Security Situation Emphasized
33480073a Bogota EL TIEMPO in Spanish
25 Jan 88 p 4-A

[Article by Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza: "With a Revolver at His Back"]

[Text] What more do we need to persuade us that we are at war? The escalation in the first 20 days of this year has been gruesome.

Fifteen municipalities located in the western, eastern, northern and southern parts of the country have suffered attacks by the Guerrilla Coordination Group which no one has been able to prevent. In Caqueta, following the assassination of a mayor and two liberal candidates for mayoral posts in Florencia and Puerto Rico, the government party itself had to call for abstention. No one can guarantee the safety of the lives of the candidates in a department in which there are three operational fronts of the FARC and five camps which shelter between 300 and 400 guerrilla fighters each, and where the rivers and the main highway are virtually controlled by the insurgent force, a veritable army.

Six dynamite attacks on the Cano Limon-Covenas oil pipeline have succeeded in bringing exports of crude oil to a halt, costing the country a loss estimated at 430 million pesos per day. The 50,000 barrels dispersed throughout the zone and into the water of the tributaries of the Magdalena have caused a veritable ecological catastrophe, affecting the cotton, rice and corn crops, the level of the river, and vast areas of primary forest, which will have to be burned.

The kidnapping of Andres Pastrana was but the spectacular culmination of this escalation, the greatest challenge yet to the vast democratic country committed to the election of mayors. This was an event which dealt a blow to the finest fiber of the nation's nerves. Andres is a symbol. A symbol of the old, ossified political class? No, quite the contrary. He is the symbol of a young, dynamic country concerned with the problems of a society in crisis, the symbol of a promise. Ten men armed with machine guns burst into the political headquarters of a party in chillingly cold blood. We still needed this in order to see the truth. And then came the bloody mockery of a city AND its mayor, with the television and radio used as a plaything to implement the strategy.

And all of this without mentioning the kidnappings which are continuing here and there in the departments on the coast, the chronic deaths in Medellin, the dynamiting of the Pablo Escobar building in the very heart of El Poblado, the strikes, the murders of trade unionists, and various other trifles. And all, absolutely all the attacks and assaults have gone without any response. The Army itself has had to confess its impotence. Its hands are tied until special

legislation is promulgated, which is what every country—Spain, Italy, France, Germany—does in time of war or acute terrorist threat.

We, who have experienced a situation beside which the bombings of the past in Paris or the attacks of the Red Brigades would be seem like nothing more than ineffectual fireworks, are witnessing the sad spectacle of a president complaining about the Supreme Court of Justice, without anything concrete coming of it, and going on then to talk to us about the children vaccinated and the pregnant mothers who will get medical care. Can one simply offer aspirin when the real situation points to a diagnosis of cancer?

What can be done so that the echoes of this war which has been declared on us will reach the carpeted halls of the Casa de Narino? How is it possible to break through this arctic wall of isolation and solitude separating the government from the nation? The FARC, M-19, ELN, EPL, Quintin Lame, Patria Libre, PRT—these organizations have millions today, and can pay a peasant family an indemnity of 100,000 to 200,000 pesos for sending a son to the guerrilla forces. The whole country is being bought. Their actions here and there are organized on the basis of impeccable military logistics, revealing that they can operate wherever they wish without suffering even one casualty. This is the reality.

The guerrilla force of the past is a rebel army today, with more than 20 fronts throughout the country, excellent weapons and equipment, a great capacity to mobilize, excellent knowledge of the terrain and substantial resources, the product of robberies, [boleteo] and the taxes paid by the drug traffickers. It virtually controls 20 percent of Colombian territory. The initiative in the actions falls entirely to these forces. Their strongholds could be multiplied by five or 10 if necessary. The FARC, in particular, have never put into action more than a small part of their potential. Subversion today is threatening the great sources of our national wealth—oil, bananas, gold and emeralds, as well as the country's most vital communications routes.

The guerrillas have great recruiting capacity, in that factors covering a wide range work to their benefit. There is intimidation, pure and simple, like that in Magdalena Medio; the economic thrust, because the guerrilla fighter today receives equipment, pay, lodging and food; the economic and social inequalities and the depression from which the rural sector is suffering because of a particularly myopic leading class and the lack of any real development policy designed to achieve a better distribution of the wealth; and to a lesser extent, the ideological motivation, as compared with the traditional parties, which are offering no alternative at all.

The only protective apparatus we have is our Armed Forces, wherein the troops are ill-equipped recruits, who sometimes do not even have boots or blankets and who are totally ignorant of the terrain. The lack of any real war legislation, the ever greater distance between the soldier in the field and the military officer on the top level who gives orders from an office, the demoralization, after years of struggle without results and without the real support of the nation, the incompetence of the civil judges, the lack of coordination among the various branches (the Air

Force is notable for its noninvolvement in the battles)—all of these things have placed our Army in a weak, defensive position.

How long will we let the situation continue to deteriorate? What should we do? Close our eyes, drink whiskey near the warmth of a fireplace in Bogota and forget the daily ration of death and attacks? What happened to Andres Pastrana shows us that we are not safe now from anything. It is Colombian democracy—and not just Andres—which has a revolver at its back today.

5157

Recent Political, Economic, Social Developments

32480083 [Editorial Report] The following items have been abstracted from reports published in various issues of the Spanish-language press in Costa Rica, as indicated. Number 2 of a series.

Gun Black Market Worries Authorities—Officials of the Ministry of Justice stated that "buying weapons here is like buying candy." Weapons are bought and sold without any controls, and the quantity of arms in the country is unknown. In the north, where a black market has developed, officials suspect that Panamanians, Salvadoran members of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, and Colombian members of the M-19 buy from this market. Reliable sources confirm that some of the weapons that can be obtained are: Soviet AK-47, AK-14, and SKC submachine guns; U.S. M-16 and M-14 rifles; .38, .45, and .22 caliber Smith & Wesson revolvers; .22 caliber short and long barrel carbines; Belgian FAL rifles. According to police, weapons are made available by deserters from Nicaraguan rebel groups or the EPS, who sell them in exchange for food and money. In a recent operation in a residence in Aguas Zarcas, law enforcement agents found 25 AK-47 and FAL rifles which were going to be traded. Statistics from the Ministry of Public Security show that in 1987, 326 shotguns, 1,216 rifles, 517 pistols, and 1,722 revolvers were imported for a total of 3,781, while locally 101 shotguns, 234 rifles, 727 pistols, and 1,672 revolvers were purchased for a total of 2,734. [LA NACION 1 Feb 88 p 8A]

AIDS Survey Data—According to research by the University of Costa Rica and the Ministry of Health, there are approximately 4,000 AIDS-infected individuals in the country. Dr. Leonard Mata, president of the National AIDS Committee, stated that among the 400

known cases receiving instruction, homosexuals are more willing to cooperate than bisexuals, who fear revealing their condition to their spouses. Medical authorities, concerned by the lack of awareness of the use of condoms to prevent the disease, have distributed 25,000 in discotheques and places frequented by homosexuals, and plan to distribute 36,000 more. A survey by the Costa Rican Demographic Association revealed that women of childbearing age (15 to 49), have a basic understanding of AIDS, particularly those with a higher level of education. Topics covered were general knowledge of the disease, the way in which the virus is transmitted, and the use of contraceptives for prevention. The survey showed that women no longer believe that only men or only homosexuals can contract the disease. However, many did not know that an apparently healthy person can have and transmit the disease, and many single and sexually active women do not use any form of protection. [LA REPUBLICA 17 Feb 88 p 4]

Drought Forces Rice Imports—The president of the Central Bank, Dr. Eduardo Lizano, announced that the bank will provide 300 million colons to finance the importation of 30,000 metric tons of rice for consumption in May, July, and August. Second harvests will supply rice for domestic consumption in June. According to Agriculture Minister Antonio Alvarez Desanti, the rice shortage is due to the drought in Guanacaste last year. [LA NACION 1 Feb 88 p 6A]

Poor Harvest Worries Coffee Producers—Coffee producers in Tarrazu, Dota, and Leon Cortes are concerned because of a sharp decline in both the quantity and quality of beans produced in the 1987 harvest. Coffee is the main product in this region. Los Santos farmers have formed a committee with producers to seek both a qualitative and quantitative improvement in the harvest. [LA REPUBLICA 15 Feb 88 p 6]

Magazine for Overseas Readers on AIDS Risk in Angola

54002011z Havana CUBA INTERNACIONAL in Spanish Dec 87 p 7

[Interview with Dr Rodolfo Rodriguez, national director of epidemiology, by Ciro Bianchi Ross; date and time not given]

[Text] [Question] Anti-Cuban propaganda claims that the statistics on AIDS incidence in the country are being concealed or distorted. What are your comments in this regard?

[Answer] Systematic data have been compiled. Commander in Chief Fidel Castro, in his speech inaugurating the Immunity Testing Center, provided detailed information on everything related to the AIDS program in Cuba. I would like to remind you that this type of information has appeared in our press regularly.

[Question] Is AIDS a health problem in Cuba?

[Answer] No, but the government has given top priority to controlling it, and has made available to the Ministry of Public Health all the necessary resources—human and material—to carry out monitoring, prevention, treatment, and control activities. Thus, we can be sure that AIDS will not become a health problem in Cuba.

[Question] How do you assess the Cuban anti-AIDS program and its results?

[Answer] This program is designed to determine the circulation of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) in the country, starting with the first risk groups that were established. It laid the groundwork for the diagnosis, treatment, and epidemiological control of AIDS. The results obtained so far are very satisfactory, since we have been able to determine the scope of the illness and predict future trends.

[Question] Dr Caroline L. McLeod, director of the Institute of Tropical Medicine in Miami, stated that the Cubans who left Cuba from the port of Mariel in 1980 brought the first great outbreak of AIDS to the U.S. What, in your opinion, is the basis for her assertion?

[Answer] In the various scientific gatherings that have been held so far, including the teleconference we held a few months ago in Quito, it has been shown that the origin of the AIDS virus is still rather obscure, and that there are no scientific grounds for claiming that it is associated with any specific ethnic group, much less any country in particular. Thus, this assertion lacks a scientific basis.

[Question] Some researchers contend that the virus first developed in the African green monkey. A German scientist, Segal, claims that the origin must be sought in

some germ warfare experiments conducted by the Pentagon at Fort Derrick. Another researcher, Strecker of the United States, says that it undoubtedly emerged from a laboratory, although at present there is no way of knowing which one. What do you think?

[Answer] The origin of the AIDS virus is unknown, as I already stated. This is why a large number of researchers throughout the world are combining their efforts to learn, in a relatively short period of time and in a precise manner, the natural history of the disease and the origin of the virus. We cannot rule out, however, the possibility that it is a product of genetic engineering in biological warfare.

[Question] Sometimes it appears that some press media would like to give the impression that AIDS is an exclusively African problem. Without denying the seriousness of the matter in Africa, some specialists and officials on that continent respond that the disease causes fewer deaths than tuberculosis and malaria there, to mention just two of the great scourges that plague that part of the world. Do you see racist undertones in this assertion?

[Answer] It is possible that some members of the press are trying to blame the African continent for AIDS, but it is known throughout the world that it is the developed, Western countries (Europe and the United States) that are suffering from the most AIDS cases and the largest number of asymptomatic carriers. I believe these issues are being studied now, and that the answer will be revealed soon.

[Question] As for AIDS, what real danger lies in the presence of Cuban internationalists in Africa?

[Answer] The same danger that is posed to any Cuban who visits countries where there are cases of AIDS and does not engage in proper sexual conduct.

[Question] Homosexuals (but not lesbians), intravenous drug users, and hemophiliacs are regarded as the groups at highest risk, but the most recent information gives the impression that the risk is spreading, and no one appears safe. Will we have to say no to sex? Like the homosexuals who changed many of their behaviors, will heterosexuals have to change their ways as well?

[Answer] It is true that the high-risk groups are expanding, and that the greatest increase is currently being seen among heterosexuals. I believe that the important thing is not to eliminate sexual relations, if both homosexuals and heterosexuals engage in proper conduct and avoid frequent changes in partners or indiscriminate contacts. An informed and educated population can change the course of infection by that virus, and therefore the course of the disease.

[Question] It is said that the most significant means of contagion are sexual contact (specifically anal intercourse), infected needles, and transfusions of contaminated blood. The AIDS virus is not spread through saliva, sweat, towels, sheets, dishes. . . It cannot live very long in the air, but must be associated with cells. Could mosquitos or cockroaches transmit it?

[Answer] Studies conducted by various researchers have not shown any vectorial transmission of AIDS in any country.

[Question] Cuba has developed its own kits for diagnosing this disease. What AIDS research is now being undertaken in our country? And what about a possible vaccine?

[Answer] At this time the battle against AIDS is being waged on various research fronts.

[Question] With regard to research, treatment, and prevention, does Cuba have ties with other countries?

[Answer] Yes, with countless socialist and capitalist nations. And, of course, with the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO).

[Question] Will Cuban scientists participate in the 4th International Congress on AIDS, to be held in Stockholm in June 1988? Are there plans for presenting any specific research?

[Answer] We will participate. At that meeting, our delegates will discuss the AIDS situation in Cuba and the assessment of our control program.

08926

AIDS Transmission Explained to Readers

54002011x Havana TRABAJADORES (unpaginated special supplement) in Spanish 21 Dec 87

[First article in new HEALTH supplement, by Carmen R. Alfonso]

[Text] The alarm that has been caused throughout the world by Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) since it first appeared a few years ago is neither excessive nor unreasonable. Quite the contrary. What

has come to be known as the "Plague of the 20th Century" stamps the seal of death on an extremely high percentage of all those who develop the disease.

Our state has devoted tremendous resources to the prevention and treatment of this disease: Approximately 1.5 million samples have been analyzed, especially in the high-risk groups. Large-scale studies have been conducted in municipalities and other "pilot areas," and in the not too distant future this research is expected to be expanded to the rest of the population.

In addition, equipment and medications have been obtained so that health specialists may determine who is a carrier of HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus).

These citizens, who are called seropositives, are at risk of dying from so-called opportunistic illnesses. What is even more disturbing is that they can spread the virus through their sexual relations.

Two factors have influenced the chains of transmission detected so far: the link with foreigners, and the high degree of sexual promiscuity.

The illustrations accompanying this article, provided by the Ministry of Public Health, clearly show the impact of those factors: A man or a woman is infected by some foreigner with the disease, and from then on there is massive contagion, given that this kind of person usually has an unstable sex life.


The population should know that when someone has a sexual contact, he is establishing an indirect sexual link with all the people who have also had that kind of contact with the same person in the last 7 years. Why? Because this virus can be latent and undetected in the individual, who remains in relatively good health until a given moment. Hence the need for collective education to prevent sexual promiscuity.

The illustrations make it clear that although the majority of possible carriers of the disease have been located in these chains of transmission, there is a sizable group that is not known and that leads a normal life, without realizing they may be infected and may in turn be infecting their partners.

AIDS prevention is necessary and is within the means of everyone, as far as it has developed in Cuba. Avoid casual sexual relations; know your partner well before having sex with him or her; and shun sexual promiscuity, the breeding ground for infectious diseases.


Stop and think for a moment. Don't join the AIDS chain.

**Transmission Chain
Beginning with a Seropositive.**




A foreign woman (striped figure) transmitted the disease to a Cuban citizen, 38, who in turn infected two women. One of them has not since had sexual relations with anyone else; the other has been with two men, one of whom was infected and may have infected three other women. The virus has not yet been detected in the other man. The white figures must be checked on a quarterly basis for at least a year.


Promiscuous Cuban Woman with Multiple Contacts with Foreigners



She is less than 20 years old, and was unable to determine precisely who may have infected her, because she had had sex with so many different partners, including foreigners and Cubans. They are indicated with question marks, because no one knows the exact number of people or their identity, given the casual nature of the relations. These contacts have not been located and therefore have not been tested; they pose a potential danger to the population.



The results of a promiscuous relationship among homosexual and bisexual individuals. Twenty-four persons have been infected from this focal point; two of them have died. A total of 266 individuals are involved in this epidemiological chain, all of them men except for one woman.



This seropositive case had had sexual relations with a foreign woman. In the epidemiological interview, it was learned that he subsequently had sex with seven Cuban women, of whom four turned out to be seropositive after tests were conducted. Of these four women, three had other contacts with other men, who must be checked periodically.

08926

Report on Imports, Foreign Trade Deficit

32480066c Santo Domingo LISTIN DIARIO
in Spanish 26 Dec 87 pp 1, 21

[Article by Jose Romero]

[Text] The year is ending with an import level of about \$1.55 billion, according to the official preliminary figures. This is the highest level of foreign purchases ever seen in the history of the country.

Also according to the preliminary figures, the trade balance exceeded \$500 million for the third consecutive year. And the balance this time, reaching almost \$825 million, was much larger.

According to the projected figures, however, more than 65 percent of this so-called trade deficit total (the difference between exports and imports) was financed by the foreign exchange earned in the free system, since throughout the year, the Central Bank limited itself in practice to allocating foreign exchange for the payment of oil imports, and in part for payment of interest on the debt.

The figures obtained show a substantial import level for new categories such as electrical plants, motorcycles and tires. But the main factor was heavy gasoline consumption, which pushed the increase for the first 11 months of the year to about 22 percent.

It was reported at the Dominican Center for Export Development (CEDOPEX) that exports for the year just ending reached the initial estimate figure of approximately \$740 million.

The main elements in the export picture reflect the shrinkage in exports of all the traditional products which, as a whole, may have seen a decline of between 18 and 22 percent.

One sector which revealed dynamism, on the other hand, was mineral ores, in which a substantial volume was achieved with the reestablishment of the interrupted Falconbridge shipments of ferronickel, although this enterprise, on the basis of its contract, contributes rather more in local expenditures which generate jobs in Bonao than in foreign exchange.

On the import side, no breakdown has been quantified for the main sectors in 1987, but it is estimated in private circles that the purchases of foodstuffs by the INESPRE and the private sector, totaling about \$250 million, exerted the heavy pressure which forced the rise.

Among the main food items imported this year, as reported by the customs office, were chickens, herring, cod, tomato paste and others.

In 1985, the country had a trade deficit of \$547 million, resulting from an export total of \$738 million and an import total of \$1.285 billion. The following year the figures were more or less the same. But in this year just ending, the deficit level exceeded those of recent years by about \$200 million.

5157

1987 Government Revenues Total 2.85 Billion Pesos

32480066a Santo Domingo LISTIN DIARIO
in Spanish 25 Dec 87 p 1

[Article by Jose Romero]

[Text] The central government ended the year with an income total of nearly 2.853 billion pesos, showing an increase of 338 million over the figure for the preceding year.

During this year, which produced the largest sum collected in the entire fiscal history of the country, the average monthly income was 238 million pesos, although there were months in which this average was substantially exceeded.

Total fiscal income, including extraordinary income from the foreign sector in such forms as loans and gifts, has been increasing annually since it first passed the billion mark in 1982. In that year, the total came to 1.024 billion.

Then, in the years which followed, it rose to 1.172 billion, 1.316 billion, 1.91 billion and 2.515 billion pesos in 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986, respectively.

The national treasury receives other income which is not shown because it is earmarked for other purposes, for example the oil differential, which is the product of a tax level for oil by-products above the import price. In recent years, because of the decline in and stabilization of the price of crude oil, this differential came to about 800 million pesos, but beginning last year and continuing to the present, it has declined as oil has gone up. It is estimated that 1987 ended with 300 million pesos available for the national treasury.

The rest of what is produced is used for subsidies for these same products, as well as for the purchase of fuels for the Dominican Electricity Corporation.

The fiscal calculations which the government has been publishing monthly, faithfully and in full detail, are complete up to November. and income of 255 million pesos is projected for December.

The highest levels of fiscal income were reported in July, with 284.9 million pesos, and then in November, with 277.7 million. The lowest figures were in February, with 177.9 million, and January, with 184.7 million.

In a breakdown of income by collection offices, the largest source was the Customs Office, which according to the computations up to November had contributed 1.007 billion, and it is expected that before year's end it will contribute 100 million more.

Up until that same month, the income tax had brought in 571.5 million pesos.

The Internal Revenue Office had actually collected 505 million pesos, since there are a number of taxes distributed among the other offices, but according to its estimates, the total amount produced by the taxes for which this body is responsible—more than 140—will equal the customs total.

The lottery, with an impressive record, brought in 70.5 million, averaging almost 7 million per month.

The "Other Income" category accounted for 447 million pesos.

5157

Central Bank Reports 10.8-Percent Increase in 1987 GNP

32480066b Santo Domingo LISTIN DIARIO
in Spanish 28 Dec 87 pp 1, 17

[Article by Jose Romero]

[Text] According to the official Central Bank figures, the gross domestic product of this country showed a 10.8 percent rate of increase between January and September, in sharp contrast to that for the comparable period of 1986, which was 0.7 percent, while that for the whole of last year was 2.8 percent.

The figures computed up to the ninth month of the year by the Central Bank show that the farm sector was among those in which there was the greatest change in activity, since it overcame a 3.4 percent deficit to achieve a positive growth rate of 5.9 percent. The farm sector showed a decline of 1.8 percent between 1985 and 1986.

Another sector which has seen an impressive increase during this year is mining, with growth of 22.8 percent, up from the 15.7 percent deficit seen between January and September of 1986.

For all of last year, mining showed a decline of 11.2 percent. Its growth is mainly attributable to the reactivation of ferronickel exports by Dominican Falconbridge. They do not, however, bring in foreign exchange in terms of tax dollars, as they are not collected by the Central Bank because of the special contract. The profits are put into the local trade circuit in pesos, and are paid to the personnel hired in Bonaio, as a result of the sale of a part of the dollars received.

Other sectors which showed a considerable increase were manufacturing (from 2.1 percent to 13.2 percent), construction (from 4.5 percent to 53.8 percent), and services (from 2.3 percent to 5.5 percent).

The bank report indicates that during the period in question, the rate of inflation declined from about 14.1 percent to 12.3 percent. The rate of inflation computed for the whole of last year was 9.7 percent, although these figures contrast sharply with the prices charged in the streets, which in no way resemble these pallid figures.

As to the data on the rate of exchange, the average for sales on the official market between January and September rose from a rate of 2.83 in 1986 to 3.31 in 1987. And the increase on the free market was from 2.86 to 3.55.

The figure for the official rate for all of last year was 2.89, and that for the free market 2.91.

According to the Central Bank figures, the monetary issue balance increased from 1.842 billion to 1.886 billion pesos between January-September 1986 and the comparable period in 1987. For the whole of 1986, the figure was 2.068 billion.

The monetary issue average in 1986 was 1.561 billion, that between January and September of 1986 1.306 billion, and that between January and September of 1987 1.933 billion.

According to the Central Bank figures, the circulating medium, or M1, has continued to rise, since from a figure of 2.053 billion in 1986, there was an increase to 2.697 billion for the January-September period of this year. According to these same figures, the circulating medium rose from 1.891 billion pesos in 1986 to 2.558 billion pesos, a substantial increase, in only 9 months.

The trade result figures (balance) were also computed by the Central Bank up to September, as follows: \$547 million for exports (the figure for the comparable period in 1986 was \$531 million) and \$1.108 billion for imports (the figure for the comparable period in 1986 was \$921 million).

The trade deficit, representing the difference between exports and imports, increased from \$390 million to \$561 million between January-September 1986 and the comparable period in 1987.

There are no figures available on the current account within the balance of payments. In 1986, there was a deficit of \$121 million.

The variation in reserves from one period to the other was from a deficit of \$29.5 million to \$133.9 million.

And the exchange balance (difference between Central Bank foreign exchange income and expenditures) showed an increase in the deficit from \$57.7 million to \$187.3 million.

The international monetary reserves deficit increased from \$330 million to \$405 million, and the volume declined from \$339 million to \$242 million.

The Central Bank reserves as such dropped from a positive figure of \$3.7 million to a negative one of \$3.2 million, while the deficit in public sector reserves increased from \$19.8 million to \$94.3 million.

5157

Trade, Economic Cooperation Pact Signed With GDR

*32980151a Georgetown GUYANA CHRONICLE
in English 4 Feb 88 p 1*

[Text] Guyana and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) Tuesday night concluded a protocol to continue trading and economic co-operation between the two States.

Under the protocol, Guyana will export bauxite and neutral alcohol to that Eastern European State in exchange for pharmaceuticals including X-ray films, newsprint and capital equipment.

The agreements, Minister of Trade and Tourism Winston Murray said, heralded a new era in the relations between the two countries.

He said the discussions during the ninth session of the Guyana-GDR Joint Commission were held in a mutual spirit of understanding.

Also making brief remarks during a signing ceremony at the Sijan Plaza was GDR Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, Claus Gaedt, who also expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the trade and economic talks.

It is understood that a proposal to establish a joint soya bean project between the two countries will receive further attention by the relevant officials.

Members of the GDR delegation who were here for the Joint Commission meeting left for home yesterday.

08309

Hoyte Reviews Economic Developments for PNC General Council

*32980151b Georgetown NEW NATION in English
7 Feb 88 p 1*

[Text]

Agriculture Gets Lion's Share

Guyana made major investments in every section of the economy during last year as it continues to concentrate on making the economy the over-riding priority.

Addressing the public session of the recent General Council meeting, Party Leader, Cde. Desmond Hoyte said that investments in the public sector alone amounted to \$945 million with the largest amount going to the agricultural sector.

Government invested \$368 million in the agricultural sector, \$116 million in the mining (other than bauxite) sector, \$65 million in the fisheries sector and \$56 million in the manufacturing sector.

Last year saw a marked improvement among the public entities. Many corporations that were registering losses from their operations, made returns to profitability. Some are expanding their operations to take advantage of the various opportunities being offered. The Guyana Sugar Corporation is one of these.

The private sector continued its dynamism. The members captured many overseas markets and produced a wide range of products that earned them foreign exchange.

Comrade Leader told General Council that the overall performance of the economy was 'reasonably good.'

Detailing some of the developments of the local private companies, Cde. Hoyte spoke [word indistinct] of the work of Swiss Manufacturing Company in moulding spares for the overseas market; and of Brass Aluminium and Cast Iron Foundry and its contribution to the local hydroelectric scheme.

In the public sector the Guyana Mining Enterprise has completed research on a new product, Guycor 93, which has been successfully tested on the world market; the Institute of Applied Science and Technology has been working on the production of nitrogenous fertiliser from local materials and has been conducting research work on kaolin helping a local manufacturing company produce ware of high quality. IAST has also completed work on the industrial utilisation of balata.

This year, Guyana is in a position to reap the benefits of the preparatory work done since the beginning of the economic phase. 1988 is a watershed year for Guyana, Cde. Hoyte said.

In addition to work on the economic front, Guyana also strengthened the bonds of friendship with its neighbours and with countries outside the region. President Hoyte said that this represented a measure of development that is not only material. Such developments provide for partners in development, safety and confidence, President Hoyte added.

Last year delegations from many friendly countries came to Guyana.

One of these came from Lesotho, which is to send a delegation to study the operations of the Guyana National Service with a view to establishing a similar organisation in that country.

JPRS-LAM-88-012
29 March 1988

47

GUYANA

Just before General Council met for its first quarterly session this year a delegation comprising Jamaican businessmen visited Guyana in connection with investment opportunities. The delegation left after having identified a number of areas of investment and with their Guyanese counterparts, setting up a Guyana-Jamaica joint private sector committee.

Other delegations to Guyana came from Botswana and Venezuela.

08309

JLP Gearing Up for Election; Candidacies Viewed

Party Actions

32980152 Kingston *THE DAILY GLEANER* in English
8 Feb 88 p 1

[Article by Clinton W. Pickering]

[Text] With speculation growing as to when the General Elections will be called by Prime Minister Edward Seaga, the Jamaica Labour Party has begun a series of candidate seminars aimed at getting its candidates "ready" and "to ensure that the party is in excellent shape."

A Party spokesman said yesterday that one such seminar was held at the Wyndham New Kingston on Saturday for candidates in the Corporate Area and St. Thomas, followed by another yesterday in Montego Bay for those in St. Ann, Trelawny, St. James, Hanover and Westmoreland.

Next weekend, a candidate seminar will be held in Mandeville for Manchester, St. Elizabeth, Clarendon and St. Catherine.

Taking part in these seminars are the Chairman of the party, Mr. Bruce Golding; Chairman of its organising committee, Mr. Ed Bartlett; Campaign Chairman, Dr. Percival Broderick and Party Secretary, Mr. Ryan Peralto.

The party has also begun a programme of conferences to announce its candidates. Two such conferences were held last month to introduce Senator Hugh Dawes to N.E. St. Elizabeth and Mr. Derrick Smith to N.W. St. Andrew.

Yesterday, Mr. John Franklin was introduced to N.W. St. Catherine and Mr. Audley Shaw to N.E. Manchester. This series of conferences will continue in succeeding months.

Also seen as part of the JLP's election campaign machinery is the reactivation of its party newspaper, *The Voice of Jamaica*. In its editorial, the paper speaks of gains made and said "1988 is a new page in our history, and one on which we intend to write achievements of a different—though no less meaningful—sort."

It closed by stating that: "...this is no time for complacent satisfaction about the battles we have won, but it is rather a time to renew our efforts to win the war entirely."

And candidate for S.W. St. Catherine, Mike Williams, reacting to a *Gleaner* story on January 19, about uncertainties of Mr. Seaga's election plan, points out that some areas are currently represented by both a sitting MP and a JLP caretaker.

"It must be noted that, in some cases, this situation exists because the MP has decided not to run again. However, in other instances, MP's have failed to make the personal commitment for hard work and service to their constituents which is absolutely necessary."

It has already been established that Mr. Anthony Abrahams, Mr. E.K. Powell, Mr. Len Kirby, Dr. Mavis Gilmour-Petersen, Mr. Bobby Marsh, Col. Leslie Lloyd, Mr. Winston Spaulding, Dr. Marco Brown and Mr. Howard Wedemire, will not be running, at least not on the JLP ticket.

Meanwhile, sources close to the party have informed *The Gleaner* that several other MP's have expressed their intention not to contest the next General Election. Among them are: Mr. Pat Stephens, Mrs. Princess Lawes-Mighty, Mr. Dudley McKinley, Miss Joan Chung, Captain Carl Rhoden, Mr. Buxton Cooke, and Mr. Anthony Golding.

It is also strongly rumoured in political circles that Mr. Hugh Shearer, Dr. Percival Broderick and Geoffery Roache will not be contesting any seats either. It is said that in the event of the JLP getting an unprecedented third term in office, Mr. Shearer would still hold a Ministerial portfolio but would do so out of the Senate.

Added to that is the known fact that in some constituencies, there is discontent over the selection of candidates by the party hierarchy against the wishes of the constituents themselves.

From all indications, the JLP is guarding against complacency. *The Voice* editorial warned against this and according to Mr. Williams: "It is a fact that for the last couple of years the national situation has shown a lead by the PNP over the JLP. But what has also been shown is a complacent PNP who see themselves as the next government. For the PNP it is a matter of time."

PNP Reaction

32980152 Kingston *THE DAILY GLEANER* in English
9 Feb 88 p 1

[Article by Wyvolyn Gager: "Minor Changes Likely, Eaton in for Miller"]

[Text] The People's National Party's slate of 60 candidates which was presented last year still stands and only marginal changes are expected, Dr. Paul Robertson, General Secretary of the PNP, told *The Gleaner* yesterday.

"We continually review our candidates and it is not impossible that we might make marginal changes," he said.

One change confirmed yesterday by Mr. P.J. Patterson, Q.C., Chairman of the PNP, is the selection of Miss Shirley Ann Eaton, an attorney-at-law, to replace Councillor Merryck Miller in the St. Andrew North Central constituency.

Reports recently placed former Minister of Finance, Hugh Small in the St. Catherine South constituency replacing Mr. Leroy Cooke, a teacher, who is the party's spokesman for Community Enterprise Organizations.

Mr. Patterson said the situation in St. Catherine South was under discussion and matters had not been finally resolved.

However both Dr. Robertson and Mr. Patterson said there was a great desire within the PNP to have Mr. Small contest a seat in the next general elections.

Mr. Small, in a recent interview with *The Gleaner*, expressed a wish to return to active politics after a fairly dormant period. He explained:

"In 1980, after the PNP lost the elections I decided I was going to spend some time to try and do a study of how we had approached the economic problems of the country and I had actually started off on a series of studies at some universities overseas and had actually done some lecturing but it proved to be a little bit uncertain in the sense that I was not able to earn an income from it and I don't think I was completely ready for what I had set out to do.

"So I decided I'd go into farming and I continued to practise law and then by the time the party took the decision not to contest the 1983 elections, I looked at my economic situation recognizing that my two daughters would be ready for university in 1985 and they had indicated a wish to study subjects that were not available in Jamaica.... I took a very conscious decision then to concentrate on my practice in order to be in a position to afford their education.

"They have done very well and are now in a position to receive grants and other assistance and when that was established in 1987 I told the party of my position and since then I have been doing work within the party, I have been serving on the Economic Commission and I am also serving as a member of the 50th anniversary celebration committee."

Asked whether he would like to return to the portfolio of Finance if the PNP was re-elected, Mr. Small said he had no preferences.

"Those matters are for the Party leader to decide. In any event, there are a number of people who have been fulfilling responsibilities in all the various areas. I think I have had a wide range of experience and that I can fit in anywhere that I am asked to serve. I don't think I have any lien on any particular position."

Mr. Small has some ideas on when the general elections are likely to be called.

"At the end of May, the current stand-by agreement with the IMF comes to an end. The JLP conference is in May. I think if there are tough negotiations about what is to follow the current IMF agreement, the expiry date may have a lot to do with when the next general elections are called."

Dr. Robertson was emphatic that Mr. Seymour Mullings, is the PNP's spokesman on Finance and there was no intention to change that.

Meanwhile, the PNP's forum tomorrow at the Oceana Hotel, King Street, downtown Kingston, will focus on the organizational network of constituencies and how the PNP intends to gear itself for the elections.

Mr. Michael Manley, President of the PNP, started his islandwide road programme with a visit to St. Catherine North West on Thursday and he will continue this programme taking with him constituency representatives and members of the PNP's "shadow cabinet."

08309

Recent Political, Economic, Social Developments

32480086 [Editorial Report] Various Spanish-language Mexican press sources, as indicated, have been consulted to prepare the following collection of extracts, No 13 in a series. Where further processing by FBIS is planned, a note to that effect accompanies the item.

SNTE Support Mechanism for PRI Candidate—The National Trade Union of Education Workers (SNTE) is supporting PRI presidential candidate Carlos Salinas de Gortari through cash donations totaling hundreds of millions of pesos, the arranging of 30 state and 4 national electoral events, and a promise to create 800,000 Social Development and Political Education Brigades through which it expects to attract at least 8 million and possibly 16 million of the nation's 35 million eligible voters for Salinas. In exchange for this, according to a 15 January statement by SNTE leader Carlos Jonguitud Barrios, 58 seats in the Chamber of Deputies are wanted for SNTE candidates. PROCESO notes that Jonguitud Barrios also wants 2 seats in the Senate, one for himself and another for SNTE Secretary General Antonio Jaimes Aguilar. The establishment and operation of the brigades, however, are facing difficulties. Many of the teachers instructed to set them up—using as a basis of organization the schools attended by voters' children—refuse to do so or say that they are doing so just to avoid problems with the union. In many brigades the membership consists of teachers only; others are left without the necessary recruitment materials and training on how to use them. [Mexico City PROCESO No 590, 22 Feb 88 pp 17-19; the text of the source article will appear in JPRS REPORT: LATIN AMERICA. For a related report on the SNTE, see No 12 in that series.]

Poll on Presidential Race—A survey of 560 persons conducted at capital city Metro subway stations during the third week of January by the School of Political and Social Sciences of the National Autonomous University of Mexico shows that the share of citizens favoring the PRI presidential candidate fell from 80 percent in August 1987 to 32 percent. Over the same period the percentage favoring National Democratic Front candidate Cuauhtemoc Cardenas rose from 3 to 24 percent. [Mexico City LA JORNADA 15 Feb 88 pp 40, 11, 12; the text of this source will appear in JPRS REPORT: LATIN AMERICA.]

Coindreau on Narcotics Threat to Political System—Former President of the Employers Confederation of the Mexican Republic (COPARMEX) Jose Luis Coindreau stated in Guadalajara on 19 February that, just as in Colombia, the political system in Mexico is eventually going to be swallowed up by drug traffickers because the government has insufficient ability to avoid corruption and because there are no democratic structures to keep watch over it. This is already the case in some cities and municipalities, as shown by the enormous arsenals confiscated; he said: "Not only does Guadalajara stand in

jeopardy but also Hermosillo, Monterrey, Tijuana, Culiacan, and others." [Mexico City EXCELSIOR (STATES Section) 20 Feb 88 p 1]

OIR-LM Breaks With PRT, Joins PMS—In a 5 February press conference the Organization of the Revolutionary Left-Line of the Masses (OIR-LM) made known its decision to break its political alliance with the Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT) and to join with the Mexican Socialist Party (PMS) in an electoral alliance in support of PMS presidential candidate Heberto Castillo. The agreement with the PMS, formalized in a document signed the same day, states that as a result of this agreement a lasting union has been formed that transcends a simple electoral alliance. At the agreement-signing ceremony Gonzalo Yanez, speaking for the OIR-LM, said that the break with the PRT resulted from its "archaic sectarianism" that fails to deal respectfully with the organizations belonging to it. In a document authored by Yanez and Francisco Gonzalez and addressed to the PRT Central Committee, PRT resistance to alliances with other democratic organizations of the left is cited as a reason for the severing of ties. [LA JORNADA 6 Feb 88 pp 28, 11; Mexico City LA UNIDAD 14 Feb 88 p 4; for an earlier report on OIR-LM, PRT affiliation, see JPRS REPORT: LATIN AMERICA of 9 Sep 87 (JPRS-LAM-87-064), pp 86-91.]

PEMEX Development Plans—Despite a 1988 budget cut in excess of 1 trillion pesos for PEMEX, bringing its budget to a total of 13.0085 trillion pesos, the parastate enterprise plans through an adjustment of investments in the areas of exploration and exploitation to restore the nation's proven reserve levels; the restoration would mean a rise over the midterm by at least 4.5 billion barrels, to a peak of 72.5 billion barrels. [LA JORNADA 8 Feb 88 p 24; for earlier reports see Nos 3 and 7 in this series, which appeared in JPRS REPORT: LATIN AMERICA of 5 Nov 87 (JPRS-LAM-87-071), pp 42-43 and 20 Jan 88 (JPRS-LAM-88-004), p 24, respectively.]

Christian Political Action Urged—The first meeting of the Movement of Christians Committed to Popular Struggles, with an emphasis on Mexico's central region, took place on 5-7 February. The gathering was called by Christian members of the National Revolutionary Civic Association, the PMS, the Party of the Socialist Revolution (PRS), members of grassroots church communities, and other organizations. Among those participating were the theologians Luis del Valle, S.J., and Enrique Dussel, and political leaders Jose Alvarez Icaza of the PMS and Alejandro Gascon Mercado of the PRS. On the afternoon of 6 February the meeting participants made a "pilgrimage" from the gathering site in Colonia (urban community) Morelos to the Metropolitan Cathedral, where a proclamation was read that strongly criticized the government's Economic Solidarity Pact (PSE) and those supporting it, international businesses operating in Mexico, and the IMF. According to a summary version prepared by the LA UNIDAD editorial board, the proclamation states that "our Christian faith is in the God of

the living; we do not believe in the idols created by the rich and powerful." Completion of a "plan for action" was the meeting's last activity. It expressed, according to LA UNIDAD, a commitment to promoting the participation of Christians in social and political organizations and actions opposing the PSE, encouragement of active participation in election campaigns, and displays of solidarity with both popular movements in the country and the "fraternal peoples of Central America." [LA UNIDAD 14 Feb 88 p 8]

Guatemalan Guerrilla Suspects Arrested—Agrarian Committee for Peasant Defense representative Jose Antonio Gonzalez Lopez has explained how he has traveled to Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas, to obtain state government assistance in dealing with Guatemalans whom he says continue to enter the country illegally and represent a serious problem for the border area population. Recently, he says, Guatemalans suspected of being guerrillas were arrested by Chicomuselo town officials after they passed through the center of the town in a fashion judged disrespectful toward the Mexican flag on display there. Taken from the detainees were weapons described as parabellum firearms believed to be of Cuban provenance. Gonzalez Lopez remarked that in the community of La Sombra, in the municipality of La Trinitaria, 60 percent of the residents are Guatemalan and that they have created a tense situation through robberies and abuses committed daily under the leadership of a compatriot named Romeo Lopez Cantu. [Tuxtla Gutierrez LA VOZ DEL SURESTE 14 Feb 88 pp 9, 15]

CNC, CIOAC Violence in Chiapas—As a result of a violent confrontation in Bochil Municipality, Chiapas, between members of the National Peasant Confederation (CNC) and the Independent Central Organization of Agricultural Workers and Peasants (CIOAC) on 1 February, 1 person was killed and 4 others were seriously wounded, all belonging to the CNC. According to a League of Agrarian Communities official source, 25 CIOAC members led by Sebastian Perez Nunez, who is identified as a Unified Socialist Party of Mexico state congressional deputy, initiated the violence by attacking the CNC members at the Trapiche Mirador ejido (Indian communally-held farmlands) with high-powered firearms. On 3 February a group made up of a Bochil peasants' commission and League and ejido officials went before the Chiapas state congress to request suspension of Nunez Perez' parliamentary immunity so that he might be prosecuted for masterminding the 1 February and earlier incidents that have resulted in the loss of life. [LA VOZ DEL SURESTE 2 Feb 88 pp 1, 10; 4 Feb 88 pp 1, 2]

PMS Head Discusses Personal, Political Background—For the text of a recent, wide-ranging PROCESO interview with PMS Secretary General Roberto Rincon Gallardo, see JPRS REPORT: LATIN AMERICA of 16 Feb 88 (JPRS-LAM-88-007), pp 54-57.

Economic Interests Spurring Soconusco Secessionist Sentiment

32480067 Mexico City PUNTO in Spanish
11 Jan 88 p 12

[Article by Hernan Casares Camara]

[Text] Tapachula, Chiapas—The old aspirations which motivated an effort to create a new state in this zone, the state of Soconusco, independent of Chiapas, and to annex the northern portion of this area to the territory of Tabasco, have come to the fore again in recent months.

The separatist movements in the two ends of this state, which is regarded as strategic from the standpoint of national security, are intensifying as the formal process in which Jose Patrocinio Gonzalez Garrido will replace the present governor, Gen Absalon Castellanos Dominguez, draws to a close.

A study by sociologist Roberto Villers Aispuro indicates that the roots of the separatist movement in the Soconusco region go back some decades, but it was in 1984, with the organization of the Single Front for Soconusco Sovereignty, that the secessionist movement took on greater importance.

The economic and political rivalry between that city and the capital, Tuxtla Gutierrez, is traditional. According to Villers, the rivalry was spurred by the winning of state power in 1979 by Juan Sabines, a native of Tuxtla, from which the majority of the governors of Chiapas have come.

The Sabines government coincided with the era of economic bonanza for the Mexican nation, which allowed the state government to negotiate a sizable budget with the federation. Sabines allocated the greater part of these funds for the building of public works in Tuxtla Gutierrez. These projects developed in such a way that between 1980 and 1982, for example, investments in this sector increased from 10.3 to 37.4 percent.

In order to prevent Tuxtla Gutierrez from lagging behind Villahermosa, the other southeastern city experiencing an impressive boom during those years, Sabines decided to give the capital of the state a "modern image." And so he ordered the construction of an administrative city complex and another for sports, together with completion of the remodeling of the city center and the launching of other major infrastructure projects.

Meanwhile, in Tapachula, which is regarded as the economic capital of the state, the local government undertook only two projects of some importance—a market and a school.

Villers Aispuro said in his study that according to information obtained from the Secretariat for Urban Development and Ecology, Tapachula showed a deficit of 12 billion pesos in infrastructure and municipal services for 1985, as compared with Tuxtla Gutierrez.

The priority allocation of public resources to the state capital to the detriment of other regions led to the upsurge of protests in this city against the "centralism and predominance of the capital" in 1980.

Groups of merchants, professionals, farmers and ranchers and civil society in general began, as of the time of the formation of the Front in 1979, to join in an organized protest movement and to demand that the rich Soconusco zone separate from the rest of the state of Chiapas.

In order to calm the wave of protests, the Juan Sabines government decided to pursue a policy of financial support for Tapachula. The amount allocated eventually reached 16.3 percent of the state budget.

The financial aid provided to underwrite projects of a social nature was suspended, however, when the economic crisis came along in 1982. The state government cut its budget, and leadership of the state was assumed by Gen Absalon Castellanos Dominguez, who had little experience in dealing with political conflicts.

When he took office, Castellanos faced a double difficulty—the lack of sufficient public resources to continue supporting the government investment, and the rise of the Single Front for Soconusco Sovereignty.

In 1983, the leaders of the Front submitted a formal petition to the federal government calling for the secession of Soconusco from the rest of Chiapas to create a new state, the 32nd.

Although the government never has made it public how this petition was handled, Villers Aispuro maintains that authorization to establish a new state was denied because it would pose difficulties for the Mexican government, such as how to ensure that the new entity would submit to the centralizing policies of the federal government, in view of the autonomous zeal of the inhabitants of the region. In addition, according to this sociologist, the new state would deprive Chiapas of its most productive region, forcing the federal government to increase its budget allocation for what would remain of Chiapas.

A new state near the Central American boundary would put the national security of the country at risk, because of the warlike conflicts in the zone, while at the same time, authorization for the establishment of the state of Soconusco would set a precedent which could be branched by other pro-separatist regions such as Juchitan, Tuxtepec and the northern part of Chiapas, headed by Pichucalco.

There, some years ago, a movement similar to that in Soconusco developed, but what was wanted then was annexation by the state of Tabasco of the adjacent municipalities in the northern part of Chiapas, including Pichucalco itself, Reforma, Union Juarez, Playas de Catanzaja and Salto del Agua.

The region in the north is very rich, thanks to the raising of cattle and the growing of coffee and cacao. Soconusco, for its part, produces large quantities of coffee, cacao, plantains, cotton and tropical fruits. The northern area and Soconusco together provide 29.7 percent of the fiscal resources, while the center, led by Tuxtla Gutierrez, accounts for 46 percent.

Chiapas as a whole is the leading national producer of coffee and plantains, ranking second in the production of cacao and meat, and third in corn production. In addition, it provides 50 percent of the domestic supply of hydrocarbons and 85 percent of the electrical energy. All of this, together with its boundary with Central America, make of Chiapas a strategic state from the point of view of national security.

According to local analysts, one way of dealing with the two separatist movements would be to cease to elect a politician from one of the municipalities in the center or Los Altos in the governmental succession process, choosing instead someone from the north or from Soconusco. This would establish an institutional mechanism for rotating political power among the three most important axes in the state.

The other choice would be to continue to favor politicians from Tuxtla Gutierrez or Los Altos (San Cristobal de las Casas, Comitán, etc.) while redirecting public investments toward the municipalities with autonomist inclinations. In choosing a politician from the center as the official candidate for the gubernatorial post—Senator Jose Patrocinio Gonzalez Garrido, the son of a former governor of Chiapas and a former secretary of labor—the man with the greatest potential was selected. Gonzalez is a native of the northern zone, and it is said in state political circles that he is very close to the current PRI presidential candidate, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, and President Miguel de la Madrid.

During the electoral campaign of Salinas de Gortari in this area last November, the senator from Chiapas was the special guest of the candidate and one of the few politicians he sought out.

The father of Gonzalez, Salomon Gonzalez Blanco, is a good friend of Salinas de Gortari's father. They were both members of the cabinet of Adolfo Lopez Mateos. Also, it is said in this city that the former director of the Interamerican Development Bank, Antonio Ortiz Mena, has very close relations with the family of Salinas de Gortari, as well.

However, the key to decoding the succession process in the Chiapas government was provided by a veteran Tuxtla Gutierrez journalist, Gervasio Grajales Gomez. "The Chief," as his friends call him, believes that influence will not be exerted on the succession process on this occasion by the autonomist movements, as it has not in other instances, but by the traditional mechanics

instead. In his opinion, this would involve the designation of an official candidate who is a friend of both the president of the republic and the PRI candidate for the presidency. And, Grajales says, there was only such man. He will be our choice.

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Recent Political, Economic, Social Developments

32480101 [Editorial Report] The following items have been abstracted from reports published in various issues of the Spanish-language press in Nicaragua, as indicated. No 12 of a series.

Massive Purchasing Before Currency Reform—Billions of old cordobas were spent at the Managua Shopping Center on 12-13 February, immediately before the announcement of the currency reform plan. Stoves, radio, tape recorders, televisions, and other consumer goods, were purchased "by the dozens" by individuals wearing olive green fatigues and transported in military vehicles with DGSE [State Security] insignia. [LA PRENSA 17 Feb 88 pp 1, 12]

Ciudad Sandino CDS Elections—Elections were held 13-14 February for membership in 10 CDS [Sandinist Defense Committee] neighborhood executive committees in Ciudad Sandino. Committee coordinators will automatically belong to the parent Zone 1 executive committee, which includes 3 fulltime "professional" members in addition to the 10 voluntary coordinators. CDS assemblies are currently being held to explain the meaning of Esquipulas II and the reasons for asking municipality rank for the city. Over 300 CDS block leaders were elected or ratified in Ciudad Sandino previous to committee elections. [BARRICADA 13 Feb 88 p 3]

Health Center Alleged To Hold SMP Evaders—The Mesas de Acicaya Health Center allegedly is being used to detain local youths captured while trying to evade the SMP [Patriotic Military Service]. The search for draft evaders is carried out by the police in coordination with the CDS. [LA PRENSA 17 Feb 88 p 6]

10,000 Families Needed for Cooperatives—UNAG [National Union of Farmers and Cattlemen] chief Daniel Nunez stated that "this is the time" to push for the 10,000 families needed by agricultural cooperatives to achieve maximum production. Thousands of additional workers are needed in agricultural enterprises, Nunez noted. [BARRICADA 19 Feb 88 p 3]

GDR Wheat Donation—A donation of 24,000 tons of wheat, with a market value of \$2.5 million, was delivered in Corinto by GDR Ambassador Heinrich Maerz to Jose Angel Buitrago, deputy minister of foreign cooperation. The wheat shipment will cover domestic consumption for the first quarter of 1988. [BARRICADA 23 Feb 88 p 2]

CEMA-Funded Deepwater Port at El Bluff—CEMA-financed development of a deepwater port at El Bluff aims at a freight capacity of 220,000 tons during the first stage of construction, 300,000 during the second stage, and 520,000 after completion. Bulgarians are "very active" in the work around the port, which will be connected to a river port at Rama. [LA PRENSA 17 Feb 88 p 7]

USSR, Netherlands Support in Port Projects—The deepwater project at Bluefields has required an investment of \$25 million and 16 billion old cordobas, according to Cesar Delgadillo, director of ENAP [National Ports Enterprise]. Additional financing was requested of the Soviet economic commission which recently visited Nicaragua. The matter was put off for further study, to determine the best avenues for Soviet assistance. Delgadillo also declared that since 1982 the Government of The Netherlands has provided \$25 million in financing for ENAP projects. [BARRICADA 27 Jan 88 p 4]

Weather Affects Banana Production—The loss of almost \$1 million in banana exports was blamed on high winds, which destroyed 123,000 banana trees at the Embanoc enterprise. The energy shortfall also received blame, since it paralyzed the irrigation system. [EL NUEVO DIARIO 17 Feb 88 p 5]

Sugar Harvest Declines—Daily production at the San Antonio sugar mill averages 1,222 quintals 70 pounds less than last year. Lack of replacement parts for the mill's American-made equipment was singled out as the main cause of the decline. Total sugar production at San Antonio as of 4 February was 487,132 quintals. [EL NUEVO DIARIO 15 Feb 88 p 4]

Student Population Data—Of 871,000 students enrolled in primary and secondary education in 1987, some 65 percent passed their courses, and 566,000 will be promoted to higher grades. [BARRICADA 10 Feb 88 p 5]

Bishop of Tacna Calls for Changes in Religious Life

33480078b Lima *EL COMERCIO* in Spanish
24 Jan 88 p E-6

[Interview with Msgr Oscar Alzamora Revoredo; author, date, time, and place not given]

[Text] For Msgr Oscar Alzamora, pastor of the Tacna Diocese and chairman of the Commission for the Doctrine of Faith of the Peruvian Episcopal Conference, the new circumstances and the Gospel itself demand that Catholics in our country make significant changes in their Christian life.

After participating in the latest General Synod of Bishops (Rome, October 1987), he believes that three fundamental changes are urgently needed in the Peruvian Church. In Msgr Alzamora's opinion, these changes would mean a veritable revolution that would deepen religious life in Peru.

[Question] What are the changes that you think are imperative for the advancement of the Church in our country?

[Answer] The first revolution I feel is necessary for us Peruvian Catholics to undergo consists of reformulating the way each believer relates to God.

[Question] What does this "revolution" mean? What should be changed, and to what?

[Answer] Look, usually believers want God to take an interest in their desires, and to remember them. The way it should be is that the believer decides to place himself completely at the disposal of God's Plan to achieve the salvation of each man.

[Question] What does this mean, Monsignor?

[Answer] Going from an egocentric relationship that revolves around one's own interests, to a theocentric relationship, revolving around the will of God. This is a Copernican revolution of the caliber of that which occurred when man stopped thinking the sun moved around the earth, and finally realized that the earth revolved around the sun. Thus, we would begin a process of maturation in our Faith, which would lead us from a subjective organization of religious life to the discovery of the objective order of religious life.

[Question] What are you referring to when you speak of the will of God?

[Answer] The common image of God is that of a powerful being looking down on earth as if from a balcony, to reward or punish men. In contrast, what our faith teaches is that God enters into the history of man by making Himself one of us to unite us to Him and teach us how to attain a new, higher existence. This is a Plan of Love, formulated to the benefit of mankind. We can find this plan described in Biblical, liturgical, and ecclesiastical texts.

[Question] What would be the principal consequences of this "revolution"?

[Answer] If it takes place on a large scale, all religious life in our country would be profoundly and radically changed for the better. Religion itself would cease to be something episodic and marginal, to become the center and permanent engine of our entire existence. For example, obedience to God would not be seen as an unpleasant tax that we must pay because He is stronger, but rather as the highest manifestation of personal and collective self-actualization.

Of course, I don't know whether this "revolution" will take place on a large scale; but every individual can make sure it happens within his own milieu.

And it certainly will be worth the effort!

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